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EDITORIAL NOTES

WE are sorry to see that our contemporary, *Œcumenica*, has had to suspend publication. This periodical, published in French by the S.P.C.K., has been doing a valuable work in making the Church of England and English theology known on the continent and in providing information about the situation of the Church in the various continental countries. Under war conditions the need for such information is greater than ever, but it is more difficult to procure. The obstacles to international communication have interrupted the surveys of theological movements abroad which we began to publish last year in THEOLOGY. We hope to be able to continue these, even if at irregular intervals. The last number of *Œcumenica* contains an article by the Rev. R. E. Cant on " Tendances Récentes dans la Pensée Théologique Anglicane " which deserves to be read alongside the other discussions of this subject which have been appearing in our own recent numbers.

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Lord Halifax's speech at Oxford on February 27 has been widely applauded as a convincing exposition of our war aims to members of the younger generation who are critical of, or sceptical about, them. The magnanimity and sincerity of the speech are obvious; but writers to *The Times* newspaper have too readily assumed that it must have proved completely convincing to those to whom it was addressed. Lord Halifax recalled Lord Grey's remark in 1914 that " the lamps are going out all over Europe," and suggested that now the lamps are going out again. But there are those who would agree with Mr Muggeridge that this time there were none alight to go out.[1] This may be an exaggeration; still, it is important to understand the point of view that is so expressed.

We have received a letter from an Oxford undergraduate

[1] See *The Thirties: 1939-40 in Great Britain* (Hamish Hamilton, 9s. 6d.).

who, after gratefully acknowledging " the authentic Christian insights into the nature of our present state " revealed in the speech, asks some pertinent questions about the claim that we are fighting for the ideals by which and for which we live.

" There is here the supposition that our ideals are in themselves good, and secondly there is a certain vague fog which envelops the word 'ideal.' Does it mean the general sentiments of decency and justice expressed in natural law, which we still profess to honour, but which derived their force from their origin in a Christian metaphysic, now widely disowned ? That is to say, are we fighting for ideals by which we do not in fact live ourselves ?

" There is of course another sense of the phrase ' ideals by which we live ' in which it might mean the conception of ends, or what Fr Demant would call the dogmas which are implicit in the way in which the business of any society is conducted. In this sense the ends of our society are frankly secular, and partly as in most social services (the horrid designation of the corporal works of mercy) humanist, partly dictated by a financial view of the ends of human life. That is to say, we are fighting for western plutocracy and western secular culture. I think it possible that there is a sense in which it might be held that though western culture is not Christian, yet it is a more hopeful home for Christianity at present and ought therefore as an interim measure to be preserved.

" The first proposition, that we fight for the natural law, is to be regarded, one feels, with suspicion. The natural law has been in danger many times lately and has not been defended. We do not in fact live by it. (I mean in such matters as employment, slums, and so on.) And it is not possible to apprehend and to live by the natural law unless first the infused theological virtues are sought. But to pursue this would reopen a controversy lately closed.

" For the second proposition, that we fight to preserve western civilization as it is, I can from a Christian point of view see no possible defence.

" The third, that our culture will provide an opportunity for Christian teaching, is of more interest. I think the assumption that the continuance of Christianity depends on the continuance of our culture both presumptuous and doubtful. . . . We may indeed be in such a situation that it is necessary to fight. If it could be shown that the state of

things after we had fought would be better than if we had not, there would then be some strong moral justification for fighting. But it would remain necessary to remember that our own civilization is not in itself good, that the doing of God's will does not depend on us, and that we all stand under the judgment of God.

" Lord Halifax says that if our Victorian ancestors were to revisit the earth, they would most certainly be shocked by the devastating perversion of German youth. Here it might be interesting to compare the rather naive astonishment revealed by letters from members of the English middle class that the young children evacuated to the country are not only dirty and verminous, but also irreligious and quite as ignorant of Christian doctrine as most undergraduates are. So that when we are told that the struggle to-day is one between youth and youth, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that what we have is a conflict between two sets of pagan ideals, between which the main difference is that the one is masked with a show of indifference and the other is unashamedly anti-Christian. And between the two forms of paganism it would be difficult to choose impartially."

The article by the Rev. David Paton, which we publish in this number, is calculated to enforce the doubt expressed in the last paragraph. We have read a great many attempted vindications of British and French war aims by Christian writers, of which the most persuasive is Dr Reinhold Niebuhr's *Why the Christian Church is not Pacifist* (S.C.M. Press, 9d.), but few of them appear to have got to grips with the questions that are raised by our correspondent, who, it will be observed, is not a pacifist in the Tolstoyan sense.

Biblical Theology and the Modern Mood

In his challenging article in Theology (November, 1939) the Archbishop of York initiated a discussion about the divergence of outlook between the older and the younger theologians of to-day. In the following issue Mr E. L. Mascall agreed with the Archbishop that this divergence exists, and he broadly characterized it by developing the theme that " at the present time the older men are to a greater or lesser degree liberals, while the younger men are demanding a return to dogma." There is, of course, considerable truth in this contention, provided that it is clearly understood that by " liberalism " in this connexion is meant the humanistic and naturalistic outlook of the nineteenth century and not the attitude of open-minded acceptance of the broad results of scientific, historical and literary research, even when these conflict with long-established traditional views. In the latter sense of the ambiguous word it is to be hoped that the younger will vie with the older theologians in keeping " liberalism " very much alive, and with it, as the Dean of Winchester urged in the January issue, a conception of the authority of Scripture and of the Church which rejects every form of infallibilism, " since the essence of such a conception lies in the recognition of reason in relation to revelation." The rejection of " liberalism " on the part of the younger theologians does not mean a return to obscurantism.

The theologians of the older generation were presented by the circumstances of their time with a task and with an opportunity. In the first place, they had to demonstrate the meaning of the Gospel in the age of humanism, when it was possible for men to believe in universal progress without believing in the Christian God. As the Archbishop expressed it: " we had to do what we could to persuade people possessed of that outlook to believe that they needed a saviour, and that God is something more than a diffused sense of amiability." The Anglican Modernists especially addressed themselves to this task, thereby running the risk of compromising the Gospel in their overtures to humanism; and they deserve credit for having essayed the venture. To the younger generation to-day the survivors of this school of thought seem curiously pathetic, like men who live in a dream, at a time when the optimism of the Victorian age has vanished along with the security upon which it was based.

The opportunity, as it then appeared, which was offered to the older generation of theologians was that of working out a Christocentric metaphysic in terms of an idealistic philosophy which was still widely accepted by thoughtful people. The Archbishop speaks of the influence upon his mind of such teachers as Edward Caird, Josiah Royce, and Bernard Bosanquet. It was thus a practical and laudable aim of theologians to set themselves " to lead a few members of a generation which accepted one large part of the Christian heritage to enter also on the rest." But the theologians of to-day are offered no such possibility. There is no widely accepted philosophical scheme, and philosophical thought is in a state of chaos. The Greek tradition both within and without the Christian heritage is widely repudiated, and certain sections of the younger generation of theologians (generally spoken of loosely as " Barthian ") are apparently prepared to let the Greek tradition disappear altogether in their anxiety to re-emphasize the Hebrew. It would be sad indeed if the younger theologians lost sight of the task of theology of providing a " universal synthesis " based upon the revelation of God in Christ. The Archbishop does not expect within the lifetime of those who are now concerned with theology the return of a day in which " theology will take up again its larger and serener task, and offer to a new Christendom its Christian map of life, its Christocentric metaphysic." The times are certainly not propitious just now for the performance of such a task, but the theologian has his special duty to perform in the day of confusion; he has the example of St Augustine before his eyes. The theologians of to-day, young and old alike, are the victims of the present chaos; and it is not surprising that many of them should be concerned, not so much with this " larger and serener task," but rather with the provision of emergency shelters—the " theology of crisis " or the " return to dogma "—which in effect often means taking refuge in the positions of a former age—the Reformation or the Middle Ages. It is improbable, however, that our younger theologians will stay there long; we shall be eager to take up the task of providing the " universal synthesis " which the post-war world will demand. We can be content with nothing less than the devoting of all our energies to this task. It will be an exhilarating period in the history of Christian thought.

But so far we have hardly come to grips with our problem.

We have not discussed the divergence between the younger and older theologians so much as the different circumstances in which their tasks have been set. It should be pointed out that many of the so-called " older theologians " are just as sensitive to the changed atmosphere as any of the younger ones. It is not all the old men who dream dreams, or all the young men who see visions. The mental age of a theologian is not to be reckoned by the number of years he has lived ! Yet there is, I believe, a factor of the greatest importance in the contemporary situation which constitutes the real difference between the older and the younger generations. This factor is hard to define, but it is important to make the attempt. Perhaps it can best be described as the recognition of the *relative* character of all our thinking and theologizing, and the unfortunate propensity of all of us to exalt our relative perspectives into absolute views concerning the truth. The disintegration of the whole framework of ideas of the liberal-humanist age has led to a new appreciation of the fact that in every period of history—but especially in stable periods (like the Victorian age)—there are certain " categories " of thought, as T. E. Hulme pointed out, which are like spectacles through which we see everything. We see things, therefore, not as they are in themselves, but as we would like them to be, as we have distorted them by looking at them through the spectacles which we wear—the particular outlook of our own class, educational background, nationality, denomination, and so on. The limitations of our natural capacities and of our acquired habits of mind combine with our sinfulness to make us see things from our own point of view and to identify that point of view with God's, or with absolute truth. Many younger people to-day tend to become cynical, because they have sufficient examples of this process in the speeches of statesmen, bishops, schoolmasters and so on. They read *This England* with that kind of sophisticated enjoyment which has become their peculiar perversion of what sense of humour the twentieth century has allowed them, and they take a malicious delight in what is called " debunking." Some of them, indeed, exalt this mood of the age into a theory of knowledge, and, of course, they have the Marxist analysis as a ready-made theory which adroitly explains away everything from religion to mathematics in terms of class privilege. I am, however, sufficiently old-fashioned (or rationalist) to believe

that it is wrong to exalt the recognition of our own partiality into an epistemological scepticism; and I believe in the Hellenic values within the Christian tradition to the extent of imagining that an attempt to transcend the limitations of our nature and circumstance is worth making in a search for objective standards of truth. But I am convinced that we have to take this modern attitude seriously, and that the ability to do so constitutes the essential difference between the younger and older generations to-day.

The word which has come to be widely used to denote this factor of which we have spoken is "ideology."[1] To many people the word is so closely associated with Marxism that their reaction to the idea which it expresses is conditioned by their attitude to that philosophy. But it is important to note that there is a kind of prophetic insight which exposes the "ideological" elements in our thinking and which is not confined to any particular school of thought. It is exhibited, of course, supremely in respect of class privilege by Marx and his followers; but it is also manifest in such writers upon politics and international affairs as Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and, at the present day, Professor E. H. Carr.[2] It is noticeable in Old Testament prophecy, where we find Amos, for example, as an outstanding critic of the ideological preconceptions of his contemporaries, and in our own day we think immediately of the work of Reinhold Niebuhr. The ability to detect ideological prejudice is one of the characteristic qualities of the more thoughtful younger people of to-day, although it must be admitted that large sections of modern youth have been trained to stifle this natural attitude of their times and to line up in thousands behind the slogans of national "leaders" and to exhibit a pathological anxiety to toe the "party line."

What is the implication of all these considerations for the theological thought of our time? One obvious effect of the new mood is apparent in the clearer recognition of the interrelation of political and economic development with the main trends of theological thought and ecclesiastical policies. In this sphere Max Weber and R. H. Tawney have already pointed the way, but there is still plenty of

[1] *Cf.* K. Mannheim *Ideology and Utopia* (Kegan Paul) for a critical and historical analysis of this word and its connotations. [2] *Cf.* his recent important book *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (Macmillan). See also F. Clarke, *Education and Social Change* (Sheldon Press).

opportunity for the historian to investigate the social origin of the denominations and the sociological background of their characteristic positions. The recent development of ecumenical activity has given to the theologians of our day a wider perspective, so that they are helped, as perhaps never before, to learn about what is going on in other confessions and countries and to see their own inherited outlook from the point of view of those whose standpoint and background are entirely different. One of the main benefits which participation in ecumenical work can confer is undoubtedly the opening of our eyes to the presence of ideological elements in our own thinking. A good deal of denominational hardness is based upon sociological factors, and the theological explanations given are often or largely rationalizations. But I do not desire to advocate any extreme form of the view that theological divergences are entirely traceable to sociological factors; all I am concerned to suggest is that we ought to be asking ourselves how far our familiar theological furniture is constructed out of elements which really have no strictly theological basis at all. This inquiry is of vital importance if we are to integrate our theology with the common life and to make our faith effective in the world of affairs. We must separate our Gospel from every extraneous "sociological" association, not in order to lift it entirely above the concerns of the market-place, but in order that our message for society shall be based upon the Gospel and upon the Gospel alone. Unless we are to fall back upon some irrationalist view of the nature of revelation, we must believe that there are objective standards of truth which are knowable by us; and we must advance cogent grounds for our conviction that we can reach some kind of knowledge which is independent of our social privilege or function: in other words, we must meet the more extreme exponents of the "sociology of knowledge" on their own ground, by proving that we have critically examined our presuppositions in the light of all that they can teach us and are yet able to maintain that, although our theological and ecclesiastical systems may be to some extent "socially conditioned," our faith is more than just one sociological phenomenon amongst many.

The recognition of the important part in the thought of our time which is played by our diffused consciousness of the ideological element in all our thinking leads us to a better understanding of the prominent place which is now

occupied in philosophical and theological discussion by the question of the interpretation of history. Whereas a generation ago one of the main topics of discussion was " science and religion," to-day the theme of numbers of books and articles is " Christianity and history." We have, in fact, perceived that an ideological element enters into the writing of history, and this perception is of great significance for those who hold a faith which is based upon history. Of course, this is not a new discovery, but its significance is the more obvious to us in an age in which the accepted categories of thought have broken down; there is now no common interpretation of history but several interpretations; and we are at once involved in the debate about " fact " and " interpretation," or in other words, a critique of history-writing. We understand better that the writing of history is not a mere matter of chronicling observed facts; every historian interweaves with the " facts " which he records his own personal " interpretation," based upon his own particular understanding of religion and life. " Impartial " history, such as Ranke, for instance, thought that he was writing, is a mirage. If we say that it is the duty of the historian to be impartial, we do not mean that he must come to his subject with an empty mind, without any preconceptions, since this is strictly impossible; we mean that he must try to be aware of his own assumptions, to criticize them and make allowances for them. The historian approaches his subject wearing his own spectacles —those of his " liberal " or Marxist or nationalist or Christian apperceptions. It is not possible to overcome this difficulty by simply removing one's spectacles, because without them we can see nothing at all except a blurred object which has no particular shape: the facts disappear along with the interpretation. Even though there seem to be vast tracts of past history where ideological considerations seem to play a very small part in our understanding of them, we are all aware that at the really " decisive " moments of history the outlook of the historian is of supreme importance. We all want to know what is the standpoint of the writer of a book about, say, the Reformation, or Charles I, or the rise of the Trades Unions. The easiest trap to fall into is that of supposing that because a writer is not a Catholic, not a Protestant, not a Socialist, not, in fact, anything particular, he will therefore give us an " objective " account. Such a man will merely be wearing the old " liberal " spectacles.

I am not here in the least concerned to minimize the value of the scientific study of history, but meize the emphasize its dangers and limitations. The latter become most apparent when we come to discuss what is for Christians the decisive moment of all history—the life of Jesus Christ. Since our historical knowledge of Jesus is for Christians a matter of the greatest importance, it is especially desirable that we should know clearly what we mean by historical objectivity in this connexion. It is a significant fact that investigators who have not believed in Christ have tended to deny the possibility of our reaching adequate historical knowledge concerning Him, whereas those scholars who are possessed of Christian faith usually assert on the contrary that we can know Him very well. It would appear that both the Christian and the non-Christian historians are biased in making their historical judgments by the antecedent weight of their personal religious convictions. This brings us to the very heart of the matter. How is it that the Christian and the non-Christian historians do not merely disagree about their interpretation of the historical facts, but are actually in disagreement about what are facts and what are not? We see clearly that in writing history it is not possible to draw a sharp dividing line between fact and interpretation: it is not that the two sets of historians have before them an agreed array of facts which they then proceed to interpret differently; their interpretation is actually an ingredient of the total historical situation *as they see it.* The truth is that the sequence of events which constitutes the Gospel-story has been handed down to us through the spectacles (or medium of interpretation) of the Gospel-writers, and the modern criticism of the Gospels has shown the impossibility of disentangling the so-called " bare facts " of history from the interpretation through the medium of which the story has reached us. If we discard the interpretation, we find that the " facts " also have to be discarded, and we are left in the position of those who assert the impossibility of any genuine knowledge concerning the Jesus of history.

This is, indeed, what has happened over and over again during the last hundred years of biblical research. The more passionately one is convinced that the Christian interpretation of history is the wrong one, or the more fervently one embraces a non-Christian view of the world and of history, the more eager one will be to deny the facts

upon which the Christian view is based. That is why the old " Christ-myth " theory, though generally discredited elsewhere, is still highly popular in Marxist circles. We have all probably noticed how, when we set out to have a discussion with a Marxist on the subject of whether Jesus really lived, we soon find ourselves discussing, not plain " objective " history, but the Marxist and Christian views of the nature of man and history. It is nowadays a commonplace of New Testament study that every particular theological standpoint possesses its own peculiar presentation of the life, person and teaching of Jesus. The recognition of this truth has caused many to lapse into a sceptical attitude concerning our knowledge of Him. The only way out of this quagmire of relativity is to accept—if we are Christians—the interpretations which the New Testament writers give to the facts which they record. Fact and interpretation are indissoluble. The nineteenth-century theologians, who had adopted an interpretation of Jesus in terms of the categories of progress and the " liberal " ethic, came to regard Jesus primarily as the herald and bearer of their own accepted " liberal " values. It was therefore necessary to explain away certain of the facts which the Gospel-writers had recorded as historical—for example, the Messianic consciousness of Jesus Himself. The biblical interpretation was not accepted; therefore the recorded facts must be rejected also. Those passages of the Gospels which attributed to Jesus a consciousness of His own Messiahship were to be explained away as accretions of the *Gemeindetheologie* of the Church of the latter half of the first century.

At the present time the Christian faith is able to attract the attention of thoughtful people because it offers a specific interpretation of history, and it is precisely on this question that our contemporaries are seeking illumination. As Dr E. R. Hardy has recently reminded us in his articles in this journal, wide interest has been aroused in the work of Professor C. H. Dodd and Professor Paul Tillich in their interpretations of history. The discussions of the Oxford Conference of 1937 were largely occupied with history. In the new atmosphere of to-day the message of the Bible has a much better chance of being appreciated, because it suggests an answer to the question about history by reference to the supra-historical; as Dr Hardy said, " Only a position which in some way is outside history will suffice for the

description of history." The strength of the biblical interpretation of history lies in the fact that it can speak of an end of the historical process which is outside history, and here we come face to face with the ultimate which transcends all our relativities of perspective, something which is truly "beyond ideology." In other words, it is the very fact that the Gospel message is *eschatological* which constitutes its source of appeal to our minds to-day; the eschatological element in the Gospel, which so embarrassed the older "liberals" because they did not accept the Bible's own interpretation of history, is to-day the distinctive factor in the Christian understanding of world-process; and the existence of the universal Church, as a world-wide eschatological symbol, to-day constitutes a very impressive manifestation of the purpose of God in history, despite its disunity and its shortcomings, at which we can point. "The Lord hath done great things for us already, whereof we rejoice." The Bible and the Church—these are the two main lines of our interpretation of history, and the two are ultimately one; and perhaps we shall not make the most of the opportunities which our Anglican heritage offers to us until, as Mr Mascall suggests, we set about the task of the "co-ordination and integration of the two main tendencies among the younger theologians—namely, the biblical and the systematic."

ALAN RICHARDSON.

The World of God and the World of Wells—I

WHAT follows may be regarded as a rather amateur attempt to draw together four things separately current in the life of the Church to-day. These are as follows: the evangelism of "young people" (*i.e.*, the eighteen to twenty-five age-group); the examination of "liberalism"; the revival of the doctrine of justification by faith; and the practice of meditation. The exploration of the Gospel and the analysis of the world are being carried out by a large number of thinkers from various angles; and in profundity of insight and fertility of suggestion, as in the range of life covered, I suppose that this period in the Church's history may stand comparison with any other. But we are much better at analysis than synthesis. The time is certainly not yet ripe for synthesis on the scale of the *Summa Theologica*

—assuming that to be theologically justifiable. Attempts made now to produce a modern *Summa* must be self-defeating, for we have not the social and cultural stability and the measure of religious unity which are the prerequisites of any such attempt. But, instability or not, the work of the Church goes on; and generations grow up to whom the Gospel must be preached as well as we can, by God's grace, preach it.

This paper is an attempt to assist that task of witness by pressing into its service the results of reflection upon three years' work as a secretary of the Student Christian Movement in a modern university. It is often held that students are a peculiar, a highly intellectual, people. I have not found it so. I have found very few who could properly be called intellectuals; and very many who reproduced with distressing fidelity the axioms that govern the life of their homes, schools and friends outside the university. In my judgment, the only major difference between students and other people of the same age and class is that students are a little more explicit and more coherent in the statement of the beliefs and assumptions in which they have been brought up, and that they are more capable of reflecting upon them. They thus constitute not a peculiar people but a laboratory in which we can discern, more readily perhaps than elsewhere, the beliefs and assumptions which dominate the social context from which the students come —that is, the middle-class and the better-paid sections of the working-class. Students, at any rate in modern universities, are excellent evidence of the ideals and aspirations, the hopes and fears, the beliefs and assumptions of young people generally.

I. Christianity as Law

I was sitting in conversation once in a student common room when I heard a shout across the room. Looking up I found I was being asked by a Marxist to come and refute the view of another student, who thought he was a Christian, that Christianity and atheism were perfectly compatible, because Christianity boiled down to being good, and an atheist could be good. This is a perfect symbol of the modern confusion, when Marxists are—with all their failings—clearer about the nature of the Christian religion than some of the Christians. The Marxists have grasped

that Christianity is about God. Not so many of the Christians.

The tragedy is that this is not an isolated case; rather it is an example which puts the truth in a striking way. Reinhold Niebuhr has drawn attention to the contrast in the Church of England between the Augustinian character of matins and the Pelagian sermons that are preached at it. In the Free Churches the same reflection arises when one passes the "Wayside Pulpits" displayed outside their churches, with their reiterated suggestion that the whole of Christian truth is comprised in advice to be less worried and more cheerful.

Religion is for the large majority of the English people a matter of ethics (rather dull ethics at that) with no distinctively religious quality about it. (The religious element in religion is covered by the service, taken by the ministers and clergy; the religious instincts of the English people, baulked of their true expressions, find an outlet in Freemasonry, astrology and the worship of film-stars and athletes.) In fact, the Gospel has become the Law. The modern Christian is very often a Pharisee. He is not necessarily a hypocrite, or a despoiler of widows and orphans. His Pharisaism is of the *good* kind, the more dangerous kind. He is more moral, as a rule, than others: the incidence of the grosser sins is certainly less among churchgoers than in the rest of the population. He is good-willed, sober and (within reason) given to good works. He is also devastatingly self-righteous.

These are hackneyed considerations. Less hackneyed, perhaps, is their corollary. It is that we are faced with the same task as St Paul. The Epistle to the Romans, and especially some of those sections dealing with the Jews, is not a difficult irrelevant document, a magnificent monument to dead theological controversies. It is our textbook. We too are faced with people whose very virtue, their observance of the Law, prevents them from knowing God. We too are faced with a large group of people who are members of a body which has been specially chosen by God for His purpose. His problem was " What becomes of Israel, the people of God ?" Ours is " What are we to make of the churches ?"[1] (We may also share the difficulties that were created for him by his Jewish patriotism.)

[1] This does not necessarily imply more than the commonplace reflection (which has, however, disturbing corollaries) that the Church is represented by minorities in the churches.

In the light of these facts, and especially the parallel between moralistic Christianity and the Jewish Law, a shortened paraphrase of Romans i, 18-iii, 22—free, but I hope not unfaithful—might run something like this:

" The agnosticism so popular among non-Christians has no justification. It is not true that God is unknowable. He has made His nature and glory plain enough in His own creation. It has been ignored. Modern man has turned from it and Him to his own works, to science and to scientific philosophy; so varied and so futile are the philosophies to which the achievements of man and his apostasy from God have given rise, that man himself does not know whether he is standing on his head or his heels. The proud wisdom of the liberal humanist has been succeeded by the lunacies of war, totalitarian religion, and the worship of class, race and sex. The worship of the creature, which is not made for worship, and is not worthy of it, has had the inevitable result. False worship begets bad ethics. The diseases of modernity—natural and unnatural sexual vice, political brutality and exploitation, international lawlessness and social disintegration—follow from the transference of glory and worship from God the Creator to the creature. There is in the modern world neither stability, peace nor trust. Evil has become our good; and this lamentable state is praised as ' natural.' The Christians hold their peace, or even join in the chorus of praise.

" This is not really surprising. The Christians are as enmeshed in the same follies and sins as the non-Christians. A sinful Church is in no position to be self-righteous, for its sins will find it out. But self-righteousness is the leading mark of the Church. Those of you who have so far not fallen into the same sins as the non-Christian world around you may take note of this: self-righteousness is the one thing for which the patience and forbearance of God can find *no* patience and *no* forbearance. Christian and non-Christian alike stand under the judgment of God; for God has no favourites. The upholding of the ' Christian moral standard '—an affair of externals, of drink, betting, sex and gambling—does not make you just in the sight of God. When God judges the *secrets* of our hearts, many non-Christians will find more favour in his sight than you, for they have at least lived up to what they knew. You pride yourselves on your understanding of the ' pure ethical

religion of Jesus, expressed in the Sermon on the Mount'; you believe yourselves to be an example to others, teachers and guides for the less fortunate; but you do not apply these lessons to yourselves. *You* are responsible for the atheism and blasphemy of the unbeliever. The 'Christian moral standard' is a good thing, if you are living with God. If not, it avails less than nothing. Being a Christian is not being 'good' by keeping an external moral standard; it is something internal, spiritual, seen of God, not of men.

"Is there, then, no point in being a member of the Church? Yes and No. Yes, because God has not annulled His promises and purpose for the Church. No, in that we are *all* under sin, Christian and non-Christian alike. All that your moral standard can do for you is to show that you are sinners.

"But the *Gospel* declares that we can be made right with God apart from the achievement or failure to achieve a moral standard. The fact that we can be made right with God is *attested* by moral standards, but it does not depend on them. It *depends* on faith in Jesus Christ. . . ."

II. The World of Wells

Christianity is conceived as "being good"; the New Testament equivalent to this conception is not that Sermon on the Mount which is so often quoted at us, but the Law. This is the one Christian element (for the "Christian moral standard" is, in its proper place, a good and useful thing; though it is time that its details were revised with more regard for modern conditions) for which the "modern mind" contrives to find some place. "Find some place" is a fairly accurate description of the position. This element of moral idealism which derives from Christianity is inserted, so far as it fits, into a fundamentally different system. In so far as it does not fit, it must be mangled till it does.

"Young people" to-day appear to have deeply rooted in their minds six beliefs. Actually, the term *belief* is misleading. A belief is normally associated with a certain depth, even fervour, of conviction, and leads to some kind of decisive action. Conviction of this kind is rare in my generation in England. A more accurate term is *assumptions*—that is, views which have been acquired unconsciously, which have never been questioned, which are regarded not as opinions but as facts, and which constitute in effect not

so much spurs to action but a mental adjustment to a particular environment.

The six articles of the faith which the " modern mind " takes for granted as undeniably true are these:

1. Man is by nature good, or fairly good, and is getting better. The Christian concept of sin is old-fashioned and out-of-date. Its survival as yet is due to superstition, or psychological or social conditioning. " Sin "—but evil is a less misleading term—is due to various removable factors—slums, bad education, psychological wounds in childhood and so on. More psychology, better education, adequate social reform will remove evil by removing its causes. The essential goodness of man will then be plain for all to see.

2. " Progress " is a fact. There is real and measurable moral progress of humanity, both in history and in the individual. There are admittedly set-backs from time to time—dictatorships and wars[1] are instances—but by and large things are getting better and better; and we are getting better and better with them.

These two points together are responsible for the view, which is quite widely held by the more logical (which includes many besides Marxists), that in a few centuries humanity will be so different that the classic statements of human nature will be false. Paul's divided will and Othello's jealousy will have a purely historical interest, because we shall be too well adjusted to suffer from either any more.

3. The main agent of moral progress in history as in the individual is " Science." It is the scientific method applied to education, the upbringing of children and the organization of the whole life of the community that will make us perfect. We all should, and many do, look to the march of scientific research and discovery for all the improvements we desire.

4. " Science " is not only the main agent of moral progress; it is also the only way to reach truth. The real world is the physical world which is observable and explorable by the methods of science. " Scientific proof " is the only proof. Scientific facts the only facts. If you seek truth, you must seek it scientifically. There is no other way. Not from the poets or the tragedians, not from the

[1] My evidence is all " pre-war." I think we can safely assume that if it was true then, it will be true now.

experience of friendship and love, least of all from religion, may truth be learned. These are optional additions to life, valuable because they make you happy, or are pleasant, or give you something to do. You cannot learn anything about the world from them. You can do that only from science, because the only real world is the physical world.

5. The thing to aim for in life is as much happiness as possible consistent with hurting other people as little as possible. (I have heard this over and over again.) To be " happy " is to be comfortably off, with a fairly interesting job, a nice house and car, a nice (and preferably good-looking) husband or wife, one or two children, an adequate number of friends, good health and the respect of the community. If you want to be a Christian, you should add to this a dash of idealism and service—a bit of social or religious work, and abstention from the more obvious sins. (If you are taking Christianity with real seriousness you might add churchgoing—" but I know first-rate Christians who never go to church.") Christianity means being good; and being good means being happy in this sense with these additions.

6. Finally, there is the current idea of love, the idea you pick up from the films. Love is the end and the crown of life; love justifies itself; to say one is in love is a final excuse for almost anything. Love is not only " the sweetest thing, the oldest, the ever-newest thing," but also, quite literally, the greatest thing. There could be no objection to this document if the *ἀγάπη* of the New Testament was in question. But it is not. What is meant is love fundamentally in the sense of sexual pleasure. It finds its normal expression, therefore, in the practice of " necking " or " petting "—that is, in the use of another person in exchange for his or her use of you as instruments of pleasure. You kiss someone, someone kisses you, not because you love each other but because it gives both of you a kick.

These are the ideas of Mr H. G. Wells, set forth with enthusiasm in *The Shape of Things to Come.* It is a world of comfort, material progress and love: a world where everyone is beautiful, intelligent, healthy and in love. It is a world without good and without evil, and therefore without tragedy, or tragedy overcome; a world of ease and amiability. A world of appalling, crashing boredom. This is the World of Wells.

III. The World of God

We have now attempted to outline the contents of the minds of ordinary " modern young people," describing the result as the " World of Wells." To the world of Mr H. G. Wells stands sharply opposed the world of the New Testament. Each of the assumptions of the first view is denied by the faith of the second.

1. Man is radically and deeply evil. To the call (urged upon me by a vice-chancellor) to purify our theology by the elimination of the concept of sin, we are responding by exploring more fully the meaning of that concept in the Bible as the only explanation for the frustration of the hopes of " modern man." We are also good as well as evil. But our goodness is, as the saints bear witness, subtly and deeply corrupted in ways which are known among men only to the saints themselves. Dare we lavish upon ourselves the praise we properly accord to the goodness of other people? St Paul maintained that no one could judge him; for no human being sees deeply enough.[1] There is a real moral progress in the individual, but it is related to an increasingly subtle expression of egoism. The drunkard conquers his craving for drink, and is proud of his achievement. By the standards of Jesus pride is a worse sin than drunkenness; yet the publicans and sinners could not, as it were, hope to achieve it until they had made moral progress to the level of the Pharisee. And whereas drunkenness and other sins can be eliminated or at any rate reduced by law and social reform, you can do nothing about pride in these ways.

2. There *is* material progress. But there is no necessary connexion between material and moral progress. Every material advance carries with it the possibility of more evil as well as more good. Poison gas is a more destructive and more demonic fact than poisoned arrows. History has been redeemed and will be made perfect. But the consummation of history, like the redemption of history, is carried out by God, upon whom history depends. It does not arise from the natural process. The New Jerusalem in the Book of Revelation descends from God out of heaven: it does not ascend from our efforts out of history.

This side of the New Jerusalem man will remain basically

[1] I owe this, as so many other suggestions, to Professor Reinhold Niebuhr.

what he has always been. The things that Paul and Shakespeare said of him will remain true, as they were true when they were written, and are true to-day.

3. The achievements of applied science are genuinely wonderful; and they make genuine and enormous differences to the lives of millions. But if you take a slum child suffering from rickets and two or three complexes, and turn him into a healthy and happily adjusted member of the middle class, you have not solved his main problem. He remains an egoist. But his egoism is expressed more subtly and less shatteringly; and we notice it less. It is important to remove rickets and complexes. It is still more important that there should be saints; these are the work not of man but of God.

4. Science deals only with the physical world. The physical world is not the only real world; it is itself only real because it is God's creation. Science is not the only avenue to truth; indeed by the necessities of its method it leaves all the major questions unasked and unanswered. There is real knowledge about life to be discovered in poetry, in Lear and Othello, in the experience of friendship and love and supremely in the encounter with God in religious experience.

5. Happiness is neither the chief end of life nor the *summum bonum*. The self-frustration of the direct pursuit of happiness is shown in the neurotic boredom of modern life. "The chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever." We live in a world which is in large measure evil; and we are no better. This is a fact we cannot take too seriously. But if sin is a great fact, the love and power of God is a greater. There is a God in the world, and He has overcome the evil. When God became man, we killed Him; therein the Cross illuminates the Fall. When man killed, God arose; therein the Resurrection illuminates the Creation. Christ is victor over all the evils and frustrations of the world; but the victory was won by accepting them, by assuming them upon Himself, not by evading them or pretending they did not exist.

The meaning of life without God is not emancipation from an angry old man in the sky and a state of increasing comfort; when the scales fall from our eyes, we see that it means tragedy. Bertrand Russell sees more than H. G. Wells. The fact of the love of God means that tragedy is overcome. We are taken beyond tragedy as Christ was;

we share His Cross and His Resurrection. God takes us beyond tragedy to the peace that passeth understanding. It really does pass our understanding, because to *us* it seems strange and perverse that peace should lie in a voluntary acceptance of suffering, as Christ accepted the Cross.

Thereby Christians are committed to the rejection of comfort and amiability as norms; to the rejection of all short cuts to peace. Peace comes only through the acceptance of pain, suffering, even agony; through the willingness to have our beliefs and assumptions destroyed; through the willingness to be unhappy.

6. The Christian view of personal relationships is necessarily quite different from the modern "roses" (especially physical[1] roses), "roses all the way." We are evil and limited. Our imaginative understanding even of our dearest friends is limited; our sinfulness is expressed in the perennial endeavour to use even them for our own ends. When we know and love someone well, we know that we hurt him and he us. The closer the relation, the deeper the wound. There is an inevitable element of the tragic in all truly personal human relationships. (Many so-called personal relationships are, of course, largely impersonal.) But this is not all. There is a deeper joy and happiness precisely because there is tragedy and suffering. We are in touch with the real world of the Cross and the Resurrection; in principle we have already tasted the Ascension to glory which is their fruit.

DAVID M. PATON.

(*To be concluded.*)

Rosenberg's New Nordic Religion and the Doctrines of Meister Eckehart

WE come now to the core of Rosenberg's religious doctrine. He believes that in the teaching of the Dominican friar, Meister John Eckehart, he has re-discovered the true Nordic religion, the basic expression of German spirituality, and therefore the true faith which the Nordics hold in trust for the world, as its rightful masters. Eckehart, he

[1] This does not imply Manichæism; it represents only a protest against the view which sees the physical element in love as an end in itself.

says, has had, like Confucius, to wait many centuries for full appreciation, but now he is coming into his own. He is the apostle who sees and teaches the highest discovery of God in one's own rise to self-consciousness, and proclaims "the noble soul" to be that which is free from all servile and degrading humility. So important does Rosenberg consider this question of Eckehart, that he devotes nearly fifty pages of *Der Mythus* to its discussion, and this section has now been extracted and issued as a separate work. In order, therefore, that we may understand the argument, such as it is, we must briefly survey what is actually known about this German mystic.

Johannes Eckehart is first mentioned in a list of teachers at the University of Paris in the year 1302, as "fr. Echardus, Tutonicus, licentiatus per Bonifacium."[1] ("Tutonicus" would seem to be a mis-spelling for "Teutonicus.") We learn from other sources that he was "lector publicus" at the Dominican college of St Jacob. He is believed to have been born somewhere about the year 1260, either at Hochheim in Thuringia or Strassburg in Saxony, but the evidence is vague, though Rosenberg decides for the former spot, and credits him with noble blood. We do not know what led him first to become a friar, but he is reported to have entered the Dominican house at Erfurt as a novice, and after completing his studies to have risen to be prior. He was subsequently promoted to be vicar-provincial of Thuringia, which perhaps implies that it was his home-country. At the reputed time of his birth the order of Dominic was about fifty years old, and its leader and founder had died and had received canonization some forty years earlier. As is well known, it was created for the express purpose of combating heresy by preaching and teaching, and its interests were therefore mainly intellectual. The two great schoolmen, Albert of Cologne and Thomas of Aquino were among its members, and at the time when Eckehart joined its ranks the former was still alive, and Kurtz says that he was one of Eckehart's teachers (though Preger thinks this impossible). The Dominicans were, in fact, at this date in the heyday of their influence, and were expanding in all directions. Eckehart took his master's

[1] This is Boniface VIII, who engaged in a tragic conflict with the King of France, Philip IV. Philip, like a present-day totalitarian ruler, sought to defeat the papal claims of super-national authority by forbidding the export of currency to Rome!

degree at Paris in 1303. In 1304 he was made provincial of Saxony (where he had the supervision of sixty houses), and three years later vicar-general of Bohemia. In 1311 he returned to his studies in Paris, and went thence (in 1312) to be head of the provincial school of the order at Strassburg. From there he was moved in 1320 to Frankfort, where he was prior. It was at this point that doubts began to be raised as to his orthodoxy. He had been regarded with uneasiness on account of his association with the Brethren of the Free Spirit, and with the quasi-monastic groups of Beghards and Beguines, who were thought to be infected with neo-Manichæan doctrines, and in some cases to be guilty of immorality. Since, however, it was the avowed business of every Dominican friar to get into touch with heretics, and to try to win them to a true and intelligent Catholicism, we need not pay too much heed to these suspicions. The order still supported Eckehart, and showed its confidence in him by appointing him to a Chair of Theology at Cologne, where he gained a considerable reputation as a preacher, and probably had for his pupils the three later mystics, Tauler, Suso, and Ruysbroeck, who were plainly influenced by his ideas. In 1325-6 suspicion as to his orthodoxy revived, and the Archbishop of Cologne lodged a complaint against him. Nikolaus of Strassburg (himself a Dominican) was appointed his special Inquisitor, and the case came before the Inquisition at Venice. Eckehart put in a personal appearance, and on January 24, 1327, he delivered a protest against the charges, and a few weeks later (February 13) made a public declaration of orthodoxy in the Dominican church at Cologne. This is the last date on which he is known to have been alive. The Inquisition refused to accept his assurances, and the document embodying the refusal is dated February 22, 1327. It is conjectured that he died soon after. Rosenberg makes the suggestion that he may have been poisoned, but I cannot find a scintilla of evidence for this. It seems much more likely that his deviations from orthodoxy, at least in expression, were a sign of failing powers (for he must have been now about sixty-seven years of age—not so bad when we consider the average expectation of life at the time, and the amount of epidemic disease just then prevalent in Europe). He was posthumously excommunicated by the Bull of John XXII, March 27, 1329, and after that gradually sank into oblivion, so that although in

1718 Trithemius issued an immense catalogue of his reputed writings, Görres, in 1829, speaks of him as "une figure chrétienne presque mythique." Between 1845 and 1857 interest in Eckehart revived, through the publication by Pfeiffer of a large collection of writings in Old High German attributed to him. In 1886 his Latin works were rediscovered in MS., and edited by Denifle; in 1895 Jostes printed eighty-two sermons from a Nuremberg text; and in 1903 Büttner published a free translation of the vernacular ones into modern German. There has, however, been some doubt as to which are really the works of the master, and which those of his disciples, and since 1936, possibly at the instigation of Rosenberg, a new critical edition has been in process of publication. Rosenberg alleges that the nineteenth-century Roman Catholic editors, such as Denifle, have treated the text of Eckehart's writings unfairly, and have allowed only expurgated versions of them to appear. Many books, both in German and English, have appeared dealing with Eckehart, and between 1924 and 1931 Mr C. de B. Evans, after a thorough study of the existing MSS, extending over some eighteen years, published an English translation (based mainly on Pfeiffer) of the Sermons, Tractates, Sayings, Collations, the Book of Questionings, and the Book of Benedictus, or Book of Godly Comfort.

It will be necessary to examine the terms of Eckehart's condemnation in order to see what kind of error he was accused of teaching. We shall then be able to estimate better, from a comparison with his extant writings, whether the church officials of his day were justified in the judgment which they passed upon him, and further, whether Rosenberg's admiration for him as an original thinker is equally justified.

In the Bull of John XXII, Eckehart is condemned in respect of twenty-eight propositions. The list is too long to be given here in full, but the main features of it may be classified as follows:

1. Statements which seem to confuse the creature and the Creator.

2. Statements which seem to equate any righteous man and Christ Himself.

3. Statements which seem to make light of sin.

Of class 1, the most glaring quoted is: "We are totally transformed into God and converted into Him even as the

bread of the Sacrament is converted into the Body of Christ."

Of class 2 we may take the following: "Whatsoever is said of Christ in Scripture, this also may be truly predicated of every good and godly man."

Of class 3 we may take: "If any man have committed a thousand mortal sins, and if such a man become rightly disposed, he need not wish that he had not committed them."

The last two propositions are separated from the others, and are perhaps the most important. The first of these declares that there is that element in the soul which is uncreated and beyond creation (*increabile*). The second, that God is not describable in terms of moral qualities. We cannot call Him "good" any more than we can call the sun "black."

What is the general impression which these various propositions make upon us? I can here perhaps only speak for myself, but I confess that the principle upon which they were chosen out by the advisers of the Pope for condemnation does not seem to me at first sight at all clear. After a perusal of the translation of Eckehart's *opera* made by Mr Evans, I think one would come to the conclusion that a much more damning selection might have been made. If one reads the context of the passages condemned one gets the impression that Eckehart was a man who spoke in paradoxes and used hyperbole freely, and that to take him literally would be as unfair as to take *au pied de la lettre* everything that such a missioner as the late Geoffrey Studdert-Kennedy said when preaching to the army. A missioner is allowed a certain amount of licence in expression, so long as he intends to preach what he is ordained to preach.

On the other hand there is very much in the utterances of Eckehart which to us seems more than the hyperbole of a preacher, and to imply a confusion or rather an irregularity of thought, and it seems to me that it was this that the Pope and his advisers intended to condemn, though it is open to question whether the Bull succeeds in making this clear. The principle on which the Papal Commission acted I believe to have been this. Its members were well aware of the trouble which the Rhineland bishops had been having with the Brethren and Sisters of the Free Spirit, and the heretical doctrines of the latter were known to them. Eckehart was suspected of "mala familiaritas" with this sect. Therefore any passages which seem to condone or

teach doctrines similar to those of the sect in question are selected for condemnation in the Bull. But, it may be asked, did Eckehart mean to assimilate his teaching to that of the Beghards and Beguines ?[1] I submit that he did not, and that all he meant to do was to imitate St Paul, and to be all things to all men in the hope of saving at least some.

The result of the policy of the Pope's advisers is that some of the most curious passages in Eckehart's writings escape explicit condemnation and are only declared heretical or dangerous by implication. And yet the total effect of the Bull is not by any means unjust. This I hope now to show.

That Eckehart was as much a genuine German as Luther, and also an able administrator of the various houses under his care, cannot be doubted; and it is also clear that he conceived a new plan of giving instruction to the laity in the vernacular, which has brought him no little fame. The popular vocabulary of the German tongue was not well equipped at that time for expressing the ideas of the scholastic philosophy, and Eckehart had actually to coin words and phrases in order to express his meaning. He is thus in some ways the founder of German speculative thought, and may be credited with giving it the foundation of its technical phraseology. One of the charges levelled against him (not in the Bull) is that of preaching to the people in their own language things that might lead to heresy. To this he replies, in the Book of Godly Comfort (which is perhaps one of the most original of his writings), " If the ignorant are not taught, they will never learn; the business of the doctor is to heal." He consistently repudiates all deliberate heresy, saying: " I protest in the presence of God that I have always avoided with horror all error in matters of faith," and in his final declaration he expresses his willingness " to retract any error that may be proved against me." This willingness is referred to by the Pope at the end of the Bull, when he says that at the end of his life Eckehart

[1] I find a serious error in some commentators upon Eckehart, due I think to a hasty reading of Preger's appendix to vol. i of his *History of the German Mystics of the Middle Ages*, where the Papal Bull is preceded by a list of doctrines condemned as heretical, but alleged to have been held by the Brethren of the Free Spirit. In some cases these are quoted as though they were Eckehart's, with most misleading results.

"*prædictos viginti sex articulos*, quos se prædicasse confessus extitit, necnon quæcumque alia per eum scripta et docta sive in scholis sive in prædicationibus, quæ possent generare in mentibus fidelium sensum hereticum vel erroneum ac veræ fidei inimicum, quantum ad illum sensum *revocavit* ac etiam *reprobavit et haberi voluit pro simpliciter et totaliter revocatis*, ac si illos et illa sigillatim et singulariter revocasset, determinationi Apostolicæ Sedis et nostræ tam se quam scripta sua et dicta omnia submittendo."

We must look a little more closely here at the actual facts of the case. It has, I think, been clearly shown by Preger that the Pope knows of no other recantation than the one referred to above, and Preger therefore goes on to charge the Pope with dishonest dealing in saying that Eckehart has recanted in respect of the twenty-six or twenty-eight propositions, since these were only published *after his decease*, and could not therefore have been before him when he made his affidavit in the church of the Dominicans at Cologne. But this seems to me a prejudiced verdict. The Archbishop of Cologne and his Inquisitor had issued a protest against Eckehart *before* January 24, 1327, and on that date Eckehart makes a counter-protest, and appeals against them to the Pope himself, complaining that they have acted improperly towards him:

"me predictum magistrum Eckehardum nimis diu circumduxistis impertinenter, cædendo me nimies et ultra quam oportet super *articulis*, quos reputabatis in fide erroneos, cum non essent, infamantes me et ordinem meum. . . ."

It is clear from this that the Pope must have received some document from the accusers of Eckehart, and the probability is that the articles contained in the Bull are in the main a reproduction of these original charges. On February 13, 1327, occurs Eckehart's famous declaration in the church of his order at Cologne, made with all legal ceremony, and attested by fourteen signatures, including that of

"Walter de Ketwich clericus curie Coloniensis imperiali auctoritate publicus notarius . . ."

Eckehart does not mention in detail more than one of the articles, but the one which he quotes figures as the twenty-seventh in the papal Bull (that there is a divine spark in the soul), and he remarks that in this connexion he has taught only what he has received from his own teachers and colleagues. The natural inference to be drawn from these

facts is that when Eckehart made his recantation he did it in respect of a document similar to, if not identical with that which is embodied in the Bull of John XXII. The latter Pontiff is stigmatized by Bishop Creighton as " an austere and narrow-minded pedant," but I think we must at any rate here acquit him of sharp practice, in spite of what Preger says, and allow his statement to be substantially correct.

We are, however, still faced with the question: " Was the Pope right in censuring Eckehart ?" There can be no doubt that behind the language of the Bull, and behind the explicit accusations of the Rhineland bishops, lies the deep suspicion that Eckehart was really a pantheist, who sought to obliterate any distinction between the Creator and the creature, and so to blur all moral issues. Lasson, one of the more recent commentators on Eckehart, says: " He taught what Dionysius and St Thomas taught . . . but he goes further than any of his predecessors and crosses the boundaries of church dogma ": and describes his treatises as " text-books of God-intoxicated piety " (the same adjective was applied to Spinoza).

Lasson is right. At the first glance one might suppose that Eckehart was mainly an original and unconventional preacher. Unconventional he certainly was, after the pattern of most friars, who as evangelists employed racy similes and colloquialisms. Original he certainly is in style, and daring in his paradoxes.[1] " The Soul's Rage," and the rhapsody in sermon 56 (on emanation and return), are unique in form and expression, and are the outpourings of a great prophetic spirit who simply cannot keep silence. As he said: " If there be no one in church, I must needs proclaim my message to the poor-box !"

A study of his writings, however, reveals his enormous dependence upon pseudo-Dionysius, whom he is repeatedly quoting by name, and one cannot help feeling that his most distinctive teachings about the soul, and especially those which Rosenberg lauds as the unfolding of the noble Nordic mind, are precisely those in which he draws most freely from the Plotinian passages in the Dionysian writings. The human spirit, according to pseudo-Dionysius, must seek to go forth out of itself (*i.e.*, out of its created being)

[1] Thus he says: " alle Dinge sind Gott selber ": " der Vater mag sich nicht verstehen ohne mich ": and " ehe die Creaturen waren, da war Gott nicht Gott ": which are not meant to be pantheistic, but are merely daring and picturesque expressions of actual truth.

into the Uncreated Object of its contemplation, and to be utterly merged therein. Thus it ceases to desire even its own being in itself. Casting away self it strives to gain its true being and selfhood by losing them in the Super-Essence. Laying its intellectual activity to rest, it obtains, by a higher spiritual activity, a momentary glimpse into the depths of the Super-Essence, and perceives that there the distinction between "Me" and "Thee" is not. The ultimate core of the soul is God Himself. This is its nobility. As Ruysbroeck, a pupil of Eckehart's, says: "To such . . . it is revealed that they are That which they contemplate." This, if it is to be taken literally, is pure Hinduism.

Writers like Evelyn Underhill stress the poetical nature of such rhapsodical utterances. They deny that this enlightenment really corresponds to the Indian doctrine of Advaita or non-duality (*Tat tvam asi*, Thou art That), and say that it merely denotes a consciousness of Divine origin, coupled with unity of will and purpose with God Himself. Yet there are passages, both in Eckehart and pseudo-Dionysius, which seem to go much further than this. Looking for scriptural authority to the famous passage in the high-priestly prayer of John xvii, "that they may be one even as We are one: I in them and Thou in Me, that they may be perfect in one," Eckehart says:

(i) "The soul, in hot pursuit of God, becomes absorbed in Him" (Tractate III).

(ii) "God absorbs the soul, leaving no trace" (Tractate XIII).

(iii) "When the soul returns to God, her idea of herself in God is that except for self-awareness, nothing survives in her but God" (Tractate III). (This is verbatim from pseudo-Dionysius, and shows the latter halting on the threshold of non-duality, and agreeing with what the Indians call modified duality or Vishistadvaita. There is a similar passage in Sermon 41, second series.)

(iv) "By loving God ye may become God with God" (Tractate II).

(v) "God has endowed the soul with His own likeness, which did she not possess, she could not be God by grace nor above grace either; whereas in this likeness she is able to attain to being God by grace and also above grace" (Tractate II). (This doctrine of "having no need of grace," though ignored by the Inquisition, is made much of by Rosenberg. Perhaps it meant less than it seems to imply.)

(vi) "God has left the soul one little point from which to get

back to herself and know herself as creature. For it is of the very essence of the soul that she is powerless to plumb the depths of her Creator. Henceforth I shall not speak about the soul, for she has lost her name yonder in the oneness of Divine source. There she is no more called soul: she is called Infinite Being" (Tractate II).

(vii) "If I am to know God directly, I must become completely the He and He the I: so that this He and this I become and are one I" (Sermon 96: On being renewed in the spirit of your mind).

These passages are typical. They show, I think, that Eckehart is really inconsistent in his use of language. He oscillates between non-duality and modified duality, between pantheism and panentheism. Rudolf Otto in his Haskell Lectures makes a long and carefully documented comparison between Eckehart and the famous ninth-century A.D. Indian advocate of non-duality, Sankara, and sees a close resemblance between them. But it would be equally possible to show a resemblance between Eckehart and Ramanuja,[1] the twelfth-century advocate of modified duality. Although Eckehart makes the most of the text in Genesis i, "Let us make man in our own image, after our likeness," and St Paul's "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me," and quotes, in connexion, from pseudo-Dionysius: "death in God is nothing but the uncreated life, that is, God Himself, *not now called the soul* but the sovereign power of God, because with it He performs His will"; yet he balances it from St Augustine, who never at any time after he had discarded neo-Platonism regarded the unitive life of the soul as an equating and absorption of the creaturely with and in the Creator.

We must conclude, therefore, that Eckehart is only an extreme example of the influence exercised upon European Christians by the oriental pseudo-Dionysius,[2] from Scotus

[1] *Cf.* the following statement from Mr Bharata Kumarappa's *The Indian Conception of Deity* (1934): "There is no conflict between the individuality of finite selves and the universality and supremacy of Brahman, for they form the body or modes of Brahman, while He is the Inner Self on whom they completely depend." [2] This involves an interesting literary problem. Professor F. S. Marsh of Cambridge has edited a Syriac work purporting to be by "the Holy Hierotheos." A scrutiny of this work reveals that it cannot be the source referred to by pseudo-Dionysius. Either the latter is misquoting from memory, or referring to some other work by Hierotheos, or else he is using the name of the latter to conceal a more unorthodox

Erigena in the ninth century onwards, and that in both Eckehart and Erigena occur " dangerous passages," which are liable to misconstruction if detached from their context, and which seem to imply an acceptance of non-duality as a goal. But there is one vital difference between an Indian and a Christian mystic. The former is amoral, and has little or nothing to say about sin. The Christian has. Eckehart's goal for the human spirit involves " a death unto sin and a new birth unto righteousness." In spite of his daring paradoxes, he never makes light of sin, as Rosenberg would have us believe. Even though he says that when we have repented and forsaken our sin God puts it behind us as though it had never been, this is only a picturesque manner of expressing what every priest teaches as a matter of course in the confessional. The distinction between godly and worldly sorrow is not, as Rosenberg seems to think, Eckehart's own, but is, as any ordinary Bible-reader can see, *horribile dictu*, from the Semite St Paul, whom Rosenberg abhors (2 Corinthians vii, 10).

In Tractate II, the very one in which he lays great stress on the nobility of the soul, Eckehart cries:

" O Almighty and most merciful Creator and dear Lord, have mercy upon me a sinner . . . and condemn me not as I deserve."

In Tractate III:

" God made the soul for His only Son to be born in her . . . as there is wedlock between man and wife, so there is wedlock between God and the soul."

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indebtedness. Professor Marsh thinks that he is probably doing the latter, and that whenever he *says* " Hierotheos " he *means* " Proclus." This may easily be correct, since the pseudo-Dionysian quotations which resemble the writings of Plotinus may just as well have come from Proclus. Fortunately the probability does not weaken my argument, since if the identification of " Hierotheos " with the Syrian mystic bar Sudaili be rejected in this connexion, Proclus is not likely to prove any more congenial to Rosenberg. He is a Levantine neo-Platonist (A.D. 416-485) of Lycian origin, and certainly no Nordic—probably, in fact, a product of the " Mediterranean chaos," whose work, as Professor E. R. Dodds says, " exercised an influence upon early medieval thought which may be called accidental in the sense that it would scarcely have been felt, but for the activity of the unknown eccentric, who, within a generation of Proclus's death, conceived the idea of dressing his philosophy in Christian draperies, and passing it off as the work of a convert of St Paul." And this is the main source of Meister Eckehart's inspiration !

Yet this union is achieved by penitence.

"I am not happy till I return to God, discarding every means of sin, and all its brood, together with all creatures."

And again, in Tractate IV: "I am a man, not God." We might almost say, using language of which Dr Tennant would approve, that to Eckehart the phenomenal man is a sinner, and in desperate need of God's grace; the noumenal man is akin to God's image. In this there is nothing unorthodox. Even those passages where Eckehart verges upon Pelagianism (*e.g.*, article XIV, Pap. Bull) must be read in the light of the others quoted above; while those in which he seems to minimize the seriousness of sin really amount to no more than the Augustinian "O felix culpa."

I submit, then, that Rosenberg's estimate of Eckehart is ill-judged in three respects.

First, in regard to his originality. Take away from Eckehart his dependence upon the Pauline and Johannine mysticism, and upon pseudo-Dionysius, and you have taken away nearly the whole of the material which he works up with his own individual genius into his distinctive message. Even his doctrine of the "noble soul," of which Rosenberg makes so much, is partly pseudo-Dionysian, partly scriptural; and the treatise on "the nobleman" is only a sermon on Luke xix, 12, in which the "ἀνθρωπός τις εὐγενὴς" is interpreted allegorically as "mankind." It is the vernacular "Edelmann" which has caught Rosenberg's eye, and has got connected with some Nietzschean presupposition of his own. It must, of course, be granted that Eckehart displays certain distinctive features, which cause Rudolf Otto to describe him as "the Gothic man." "The Soul's Rage"—a capriccio as Büttner calls it—is a picturesque description of the same mood as that which we find in the 42nd Psalm, the thirst of the soul for God, and in Browning's poem "Johannes Agricola"—glowing aspiration; and his reference to the "sport of God," His almost playful energy, though equally picturesque, is not unlike the Indian idea of Lila, the sportive release by Brahma of His surplus energy, and also like the idea which occurs in a poem by Francis Thompson:

So best God loves to jest
With children small—a freak
Of heavenly hide-and-seek
Fit
For thy wayward wit.

Yet however much Otto may distinguish Eckehart from Plotinus in his methods, the goal of the two men is similar, and Otto errs seriously in almost ignoring the indebtedness of Eckehart to pseudo-Dionysius, which appears on nearly every page.

Secondly, in regard to his "Nordic spirit." Eckehart draws the major part of his inspiration from non-Nordics, and shows no discomfort in doing so. St Paul and St John are Jews, and pseudo-Dionysius was in all probability a Syrian monk, himself largely indebted to "the holy Hierotheos," who has been identified either with the Syrian mystic, Stephen bar-Sudaili, or with the Levantine neo-Platonist Proclus. St Augustine is also largely quoted. What therefore becomes of Rosenberg's tirade against "infection with the poison of Semites, Syrians and African bastards"?

Had not Lutheran theology become obsessed with the doctrine of man's total corruption (a deduction possibly encouraged by the admitted tendency of the central European Teuton to regard Nature as wrathful and sinister), it would not have seemed as though the doctrine of the "Fünklein"—the Divine spark within us—were so distinctively "Nordic," for this doctrine is not unorthodox, and is never absent from the minds of the great Eastern theologians. The claim that it is peculiarly "Nordic" cannot be sustained. In any case, Eckehart is not at all a good example of Germanic "Stolz" (pride). He is for ever stressing humility as a necessary virtue, and declares that no greater valour exists, no sterner fight is to be waged, than that in respect of self-effacement, self-oblivion.

Thirdly, in regard to his relation to the Church: John XXII and his officials had, as we have seen, really no alternative but to condemn the unguarded language of Eckehart's later years, and even Eckehart himself declared that he did not intend it to convey the extreme meaning which his looseness of phrase sometimes implies. He was essentially a mission preacher, and the simple and vivid colloquialism of his "Collationes"—popular addresses delivered at meal-times to guilds of laity—is delightful. But he admits that people do not always understand his sermons, and he gives advice to one grumbler, showing that he felt it to be needed. Moreover, a missioner, when he is appointed to a Chair of Theology, must be careful of his choice of words. He must show a sense of responsibility. And we cannot but conclude that the luxuriant eloquence

of the mystical pulpit orator sometimes allowed him to use language which was less becoming to a lecturer in Theology.

It is curious to note how very lenient the Church has been over the use of the pseudo-Dionysian writings by her members. I am afraid we must set it down to an uncritical acceptance of their traditional authorship. Even Popes in the Middle Ages thought, no doubt, that the actual disciple of St Paul the Apostle could not possibly utter heresy, though his doctrine of the super-essential Godhead is plainly Plotinian rather than Christian. But when her children took the ideas of the (reputed) Areopagite and put them into words of their own choice, as Eckehart certainly does in the tenth and twenty-eighth of his condemned propositions, when they expanded them to their logical conclusion—then the Church stepped in with a veto. She had no option, for as Przywara says: " Even for the highest mystical union, God remains the One who dwells in light unapproachable . . . creature remains creature, and God remains God, *other than the creaturely*." But to condemn the language is not to condemn the man, and when Eckehart declared publicly his intention only to teach what the Church meant him to teach he was perfectly sincere. Apotheosis or deification was an orthodox doctrine in the Eastern Church before the Great Schism, and is implied in the well-known words of Athanasius: " God became man in order that we might become divine." When Eckehart in his forty-first sermon (second series) says:

> " In dying to her own nature and her being and her life the soul is born in her divinity. That is her becoming. She becomes so wholly one that there is no distinction except that He stays God and she stays soul,"

he is being quite orthodox.

Eckehart, if now alive, would certainly protest violently at being employed in support of Rosenberg's new religion. I think he would say as he did on a previous occasion: " Infamantes me et ordinem meum. . . ."

There is much more in *Der Mythus* with which I have no space to deal (not least the lengthy discussion of European art and philosophy), but I think enough has been said to demonstrate that, without any unfair belittlement of the past contributions made by Germans towards the riches of our common civilization, we must conclude that Rosen-

berg's main argument is constructed upon the unsoundest of foundations. It is really all of it based upon the validity of the "Nordic myth." Take away the major premiss, and the conclusions collapse.

If the Reichskulturleiter is allowed to shepherd his flock into intellectual and spiritual isolation, their own life will be immeasurably impoverished, and their chance of continuing to contribute worthily to that common civilization must dwindle to vanishing point.

A. C. Bouquet.

(*Concluded.*)

The Beliefs of Mr Forster

Howard's End, the fourth of Mr E. M. Forster's novels, was a book of the season in 1910. Thirty years of rapidly changing fashions have not submerged it, and the reputation of the author has not suffered the fate of many of his contemporaries. He is not read only by the middle-aged; rising young men dedicate their books to him, and Mrs Leavis puts him among the half-dozen novelists of the day whom the really intelligent reader is permitted to admire.

This is sufficiently unusual to attract our attention to anything that Mr Forster writes, particularly when he turns from fiction to a personal confession of faith. Moreover, his pamphlet *What I Believe*[1] is by way of being a tract for the times. It is confessedly provoked by the actual state of the world, the threatening triumph of ignorance and violence. Whatever he may have to say, we may well listen when a man of unusual intelligence, sensibility, and integrity speaks on matters of immediate and grave importance.

I

He begins: "I do not believe in Belief." This, he admits, at once puts him in a minority. For years people have been crying for a return of faith; in the increasing disintegration of society they have seen the result of a decay in belief. Political and economic evils, the anarchy of opinion, the decline of the arts, all are attributed to a want of a common faith such as animated all Europe in the

[1] Hogarth Press, 1939. Price 6d.

Middle Ages and produced the Gothic cathedrals, the *Summa Theologica*, the *Divine Comedy* and the *Canterbury Tales*. And now their prayer is beginning to be realized: reason is cried down; the all-dissolving scepticism which came to a climax in the decade following the war is outmoded. Faith comes to her own again and is in the saddle over more than half Europe. And we do not like the result. The Age of Faith, says Mr Forster, is " bloody in every sense of the word."

The Christian can agree. Perfectly bloody. But he, no more than Mr Forster, believes in belief for its own sake. For him it is not faith, the act of believing, nor even *the* Faith, the contents of belief, that matters so much, but the object of faith, that which we believe in. And if the present state of the world is so " extremely unpleasant " it is not because it is an Age of Faith, but because it is a faith in the wrong things that dominates men. Not because the Twilight of the Gods is over, but because the deities that show their heads again and receive the homage of men are false gods.

And this being so, scepticism becomes a part of the duty of a Christian. In the babel that surrounds him of loudspeakers, affirming belief in science, in the collectivity, in blood and soil, in the destiny of the British people, or what not else, the Christian murmurs the words of Mr Forster, " Lord, I disbelieve, help Thou my unbelief." The " necessity of scrutiny " to which Brother George Every has drawn our attention in these pages is being increasingly forced upon the Christian. But the task of criticism is easier for him because he does possess criteria. He can be effectively sceptical because he is not universally so. His disbelief springs from his beliefs.

And when Mr Forster speaks as if the boom in belief had forced certain beliefs upon him in self-defence he is either having his little joke or he is admitting a failure in self-knowledge. For it is plain that the beliefs which he expounds in this pamphlet have not been suddenly imposed upon him by the logic, the bad logic, of events. There is in them nothing to surprise the reader of his novels. And he knows quite well that a measure of belief is essential to living. Montaigne (who is one of Mr Forster's lawgivers) may sit in his tower all day suspending judgment, but by evening he will be hungry, and when supper is brought he will not ask, *Que sçais-je ?* He will fall to, in animal faith.

Mr Forster is an individualist and it is likely that his real quarrel is with mass-production in beliefs, the doling out to infinitely variable minds of stock-pattern creeds marked with a government stamp. Nevertheless the publication of his pamphlet implies a pretension that his beliefs are more than a private concern, that they can, even should, be shared. There is an appeal to a common mind. His individualism may be a rare bloom, but it grows in the common field of a society with a minimum, a dwindling remnant, of common beliefs and traditions. There is a beloved Republic (may we whisper, an invisible Church ?) which claims his loyalty.

II

He believes, to begin with, in " personal relationships." The phrase tells us little; it is neutral; personal relationships can be good or bad. But we gather that it means " tolerance, good temper and sympathy," being fond of people and trusting them. It means treating people as persons, having an individual and particular value in themselves, not merely as units in a mass, cogs in the vast machinery of State. The Schlegels, it will be remembered (in *Howard's End*), believed in " the supremacy of personal relations." They tried so hard to treat that incredible insurance clerk, Leonard Bast, as a person. On the other hand the Wilcoxes believed in things, in property, in status, rather than in persons. They were rude to servants on principle, believing that servants like you to be rude to them, just as foxes delight in being hunted and niggers in being kicked.

Loyalty to individuals; that is what matters, that is the supreme thing, over-riding the claims of cause or class or country. It looks very like loving your neighbour as yourself. But Mr Forster is a little shy of the word love. He has written elsewhere that tolerance is more desirable than love, because love so easily breeds hatred. Love is a jealous god, a trifle too hot and violent for the mild air of Mr Forster's Elysian Fields, where Montaigne and Erasmus are the lawgivers and " where even the immoral are admitted."

The immoral; who are they ? We suspect that it is used here in a Wilcoxian sense. Would he admit the fanatic and the storm-trooper—or even the Charles Wilcoxes, who are scarcely persons, merely hard thin shells covering " panic and emptiness," crying, " Want, want "? And

what about the merely dull, the devitalized, the imitative? One can treat Leonard Bast as a person, for even if his disapproving brother may be a churchwarden, Leonard has his aspirations, he does attend symphony concerts. But what about poor Jacky, his foolish wife and ex-mistress? What place is there for her in the Elysium of the creative people? Personal relations imply a basis of equality, and in what sense can the Schlegels and the Jacky Basts be called equals?

> "One must be fond of people and trust them if one is not to make a mess of life, and it is therefore essential that they should not let one down. They often do."

What then? "I must myself be as reliable as possible," says Mr Forster. But that evades the real problem, which is that of the other man's reliability. What happens when a man not merely lets you down, say, out of his weakness, his failure to rise to an occasion, but does the dirty on you, a positive wrong. What if my own familiar friend betrays me? Is it good enough to comfort myself with the knowledge of my own rectitude, the thought that at least I have done the decent thing? And having done so much, is my debt discharged, do my responsibilities end, do personal relations cease, am I relieved of the obligation of going on being fond of him? Are "personal relations" so easy a matter? Are they simply a question of trusting the trustworthy, loving the lovable, helping only the deserving poor? What thank have ye? The insensitive, the unimaginative, the uncreative, the lovers of power, the Charliest of Wilcoxes can and do manage that.

A dreadful moment of doubt came to Margaret Schlegel in which she asked herself, "Do personal relations lead to sloppiness in the end?" It is possible.

III

But the world of personal relationships is a small one; or, rather, it is a series of overlapping small worlds. The whole of the human race is involved, but for each human being the sphere in which they operate is narrowly limited, comprising only those with whom he comes into direct contact. At the same time he lives in a very much larger world than that of personal relations. It is not merely that the small circles overlap and interlink, so that the individual affects and is affected by the lives of many with whom he

never comes into contact. But society is more than the sum of all these private worlds, these nucleated human atoms. It has certain characteristics of an organism; at least it is, for good or ill, organized. There are nations, there are states, there is such a thing as politics.

Mr Forster moves uneasily in this larger world. He would like to ignore it; we have seen that he considers its claims inferior to the claims of his private loves and loyalties. He is not alone in this; for years now the common man has been showing a deep and to many a disquieting indifference to politics. He has not been able to escape them, but he has found them bewildering and disgusting. " It's a dirty business," he would mutter, and turn to the cricket news.

The fact of war has not materially altered the bearing of Mr Forster's pamphlet, for it was the preliminaries to war that prompted him to write it. Democracy is now in the field; then it was in the dock, and he was moved to give evidence for the defence. He is not a powerful advocate, but he thinks that on the whole democracy is the form of government most favourable to the flourishing of personal relations. It starts, he thinks, from the assumption that the individual is important; the individual, the sensitive creative person, gets more of a chance under democracy than elsewhere, and the people who see life in terms of power are correspondingly discouraged. There are critics of democracy, however, who ask whether it does not involve the rule of the majority and therefore the swamping of the individual by the average.

But in the context the important thing about democracy is that it stands, ideally, for government by reason, discussion, and agreement. And it is this ideal which is now challenged. Mr Forster is not so naive as we may seem to make him; he has not many illusions about the gulf between the ideal and the actuality of democracy. He would probably admit that it is the failure of the actuality which has provoked the challenge, that it is because the ideal has been used as a mask for greed and violence that it is being rejected by so many to-day who are not more greedy or violent or self-seeking than the average. With many the initial motive is the desire to face the facts of political life nakedly and honestly.

Mr Forster, too, desires to face facts. We must recognize, he says, that " all society rests upon force." But, he goes on, it is in the intervals when force does not " come to the

front" that "all the great creative actions and all the decent human relations" occur, and it is our business to lengthen those intervals. The problem is the limitation of force or violence. But before we can tackle it we need something like a metaphysic of force, and here Mr Forster is disappointing. He falls back upon Eddaic or Wagnerian mythology and involves our minds in Northern mists. Violence, he thinks, is "the ultimate reality on earth," but it is an evil reality, destructive of man and "all his lovely creations." And yet man obstinately insists on behaving creatively and being loyal and sympathetic. It is not explained how, if violence is the ultimate reality, creativeness and sympathy and loyalty came into being. Nor is it very clear how they can be maintained against the destructive rage of Fafnir and the giants. Violence, says Mr Forster, must be kept shut away in a box as long as possible. But that means vigilance and force, and how are we to use force if we keep it shut up all the time? "All society rests on force," and society, even for an individualist like Mr Forster, is a good, for the people whom he most respects behave as if it were eternal. And the queer thing is that though they are acting on what we are told is a false assumption, they achieve small successes, and Mr Forster, if he sees no sure ground for hope, will not deny the bare possibility of triumph. He even drops a hint that violence may be only a partner, albeit the major partner, in "this muddled establishment." And indeed if it is the ultimate reality it is neither "courage nor cowardice" but merely folly to "look the other way." The giants may be stupid, but why should we imitate their blindness?

But we are not yet out of the muddle. There is the problem of how private decencies can be transmitted to public life.

"The man who is selling newspapers outside the Houses of Parliament can safely leave his papers to go for a drink and his cap beside them; anyone who takes a paper is sure to drop a copper into the cap." But it is different inside the railings: "No caps upon the pavement, but suspicion, treachery, and armaments." It is the problem of the gulf between Moral Man and Immoral Society. There is no need to exaggerate the gulf. Governments have been known to do the decent thing, and private life is not exempt from suspicion, cheating, and bullying. The violence, the meanness, the cowardice of nations are the reflection on a

large scale of the violence, meanness, and cowardice of private individuals. Still, there is the gulf; decency and generosity stand a better chance, are in fact more prevalent, among individuals than between nations. Why is this so? Why is it that men who in their private dealings are honest, kindly, considerate, behave like bullies, cowards, and cheats in their public capacity? Why is it that men sink their morals when they act in the mass?

Mr Forster says, "As soon as people have power they go crooked." Others, such as Leibniz, Wordsworth, and Mr Bertrand Russell, have made the same observation. Most people at some time and in some measure, whether as parent or employer or as having some degree of superiority in brains or brawn or wealth or position, possess power over others, which may or may not be used mercifully, considerately, disinterestedly. But the crookedness is not so noticeable in private as in public life. Is it the mere possession of political power that is evil?

Or does the source of corruption lie in the organization of human society? Is it institutions that are evil? The idea is not uncommon, and Mr Forster seems disposed to accept it. He writes: "The more highly public life is organized the lower does its morality sink," and he comments on the fact that "all attempts to organize (the Best People) fail." It is a kind of political Manicheism. It is as if we said: The Spirit of Man is pure and free; organize it, you put it in chains, you destroy its purity; give it a body and it dies.

We may link this tendency to put the blame for the evils of public life on human institutions with Mr Forster's way of speaking as if violence were something external to humanity, or at any rate a slowly dwindling inheritance from a subhuman state of being. Man, he remarks, has only been in power for a few thousand years; he speaks of "the victory of our queer race over cruelty and chaos." What he will not admit is that the source of the evil may be in man himself; that it is the will of man, not his institutions, that is corrupt. For to admit the doctrine of the Fall of Man would be the beginning of admitting the rest of the claims of the Christian faith, and that is out of the question. Christianity was a spiritual force once, but the spirit in it is dead beyond any hope of resurrection. It cannot cope with the present crisis.

How, then, are we to cope with it?

Man can and must "organize his own goodness." What does this mean? Mr Forster talks at times as if we could divide the world between the Schlegels and the Wilcoxes—the creative people who are loyal and kind and imaginative on the one hand; and on the other, the materialists, the lovers of power and property, the greedy and the violent. He believes in an aristocracy not of rank and power, but one of "the sensitive, the considerate, and the plucky," artists and home-builders. But he is aware of the fallacy in this division. For the trouble is that the creative people have their lapses into violence; their tolerance and considerateness are intermittent. And the wielders of power, the dictators, the ruthless captains of industry, so selfish and cruel in their public acts, are often, in their private lives, the most charming, modest, and kindly of men.

Organizing goodness does not mean organizing this creative aristocracy. All attempts to do so, says Mr Forster, have failed, and are indeed bound to fail. He does not say why.

They fail in so far as they are based on the notion that the members of the organization *are* the Best People, a moral aristocracy, more "sensitive and considerate and plucky" than the rest of humanity. The true basis of any society capable of redeeming the world from its mess must be that it is a society, not of saints and holy people, but of sinners defective in courage, sensibility, and imagination, and aware that they need redemption as much as the rest of the world. The violence from which the creative man tries to escape is not some inexplicable force acting on him from without. The enemy is within. The dragon begins life as a worm, a very small worm, in the gut of every babe that is born into the world.

This Mr Forster will not allow. We do not, he says, need a change of heart (nor any purging of the gut). All we have to do is to "make effective" the existing good will and good temper, "ordering and distributing man's native goodness." How it is to be done he does not tell us. It does not very much matter; the reader of Theology will be more concerned to know what in the end it amounts to. The end of it is not to make man better but that man may "shut up force into its box and so gain time," not to glorify God, but "to explore the universe and to set his mark upon it worthily." We may compare this with a phrase on the first page of the pamphlet,

"Science, who ought to have ruled, plays the subservient pimp." This is worthy of Mr H. G. Wells. But oh, Mr Forster!

IV

Mr Forster confesses himself to be a liberal and an individualist. He is a grandchild of the Enlightenment. We can see the filiation in the strain of sub-Voltairean mockery that we find in some of his work. But he and his likes in this decade have lost the confidence of their grandsires. They are not so sure of the coming triumph of light over medieval darkness, of reason over unreason.[1] Liberalism is crumbling (the phrase is Mr Forster's); it has survived into an age largely of its own making, but somehow or other obstinately refusing to fit into its categories. Those categories never did fit all the facts, but the awkward facts are more blatantly inconvenient now than they were, say, thirty years ago. And if the liberals are a little rattled (again, Mr Forster's phrase) it is not becoming to strike a superior attitude; few of us have quite escaped the infection of liberalism. They are rattled because they are confronted with something which they cannot deny, and cannot explain without rejecting principles dear to them. Hence the rising note of emotion, of exasperation that has characterized them during the last year or two. They are not prepared to abandon the liberal dogma of the goodness of man—for the rejection of original sin, which T. E. Hulme declared to be the note of romanticism, is more fitly to be attributed to liberalism. The problem of man born free but everywhere found in chains is solved by blaming the slavery on human institutions, on priestcraft, on kingship, on capitalism, on the educational system, on anything that will remove the stigma from human nature, that will relieve man of the necessity of repentance. The rise of totalitarian systems and the cult of violence are explained as "reaction," a temporary, a deplorable, an exasperating, an ultimately inexplicable interruption of

[1] Moreover, as Fielding says in *A Passage to India*, "it is difficult as we get on in life to resist the supernatural," and Mr Forster at times flirts with a kind of mysticism. "Perhaps life is a mystery and not a muddle." It is a Word-less mysticism, however, which finds Christianity too talkative. For Mrs Moore "all its divine words, from 'Let there be light' to 'It is finished,' only amounted to 'boum.'"

But this is outside the scope of an essay which does not pretend to review Mr Forster's work as a whole.

" progress." It must not be admitted that they have any connexion with liberalism and individualism, or in any way are derived from the cult of the free and unchecked expansive impulses of human nature.

Mr Forster remains comparatively cool. But he remains an unrepentant individualist. His individualism is nothing so crude as the Victorian self-help-and-devil-take-the-hindmost brand. Even the liberals abandoned that long ago. It was all very well to talk about enlightened self-interest, but when the self is the sole judge of its own enlightenment, the results can be appalling. And bating the more obvious horrors of industrialism, it is becoming almost a commonplace that the individualist atomization of society has the result of submerging the individual in the mass, and robbing him by atrophy of the power of initiative and responsibility. The dictator, indeed, whom Mr Forster seems to blame for this swamping of individuality, is a symptom rather than a cause, the crown and completion of a process that has been going on for decades.

Anyway, it is the variability of the individual that Mr Forster cares for. He wants a state of affairs which will encourage genius, the variation from the average, the " original, spare, strange." And in a faint flicker of hope he believes that individuality will prevail.

> " The Dictator can grind down his citizens till they are all alike, but he cannot melt them into a single man."

The inescapable incidents of birth and death conspire against him. *On mourra seul*, as Pascal says. And Mr Forster concludes:

> " The memory of birth and the expectation of death always lurk within the human being, making him separate from his fellows and consequently capable of intercourse with them. Naked I came into the world, naked I shall go out of it ! And a very good thing, too, for it reminds me that I am naked under my shirt, whatever its colour."

This is well said, but what has it to do with individualism ? It is not the individuality, the distinctiveness of the human being that is revealed in death, but his commonness, his likeness to others. Nevertheless, by accident or not, Mr Forster is right. For it is not the assertion of Man's virtue or wit or even his common decency, but the admission of his nakedness of all these which is the only possible basis for any proper valuation of human nature, the only sure

defence against those forces which attempt the destruction of man's dignity.

But that leads us into a region of thought where Mr Forster will be unwilling to follow us.

J. D. C. Pellow.

Worship and Life: A Theological Summary

What is Worship?

"Worship" is a good old English word, and in its essence it does not necessarily mean anything particularly religious. Worship is just worth-ship, and signifies the rendering to any person or body of persons of that to which their worthiness entitles them. So a magistrate on the bench is addressed as "Your worship," the bridegroom in the Marriage Service promises to worship his bride with his body, and one of the London livery companies is called the Worshipful Company of Spectacle-Makers. Neither the magistrate, the bride, nor the master-opticians are entitled to the reverence which is due to God; they are, however, each of them *worthy*, because of the importance of the offices which they fill, and each of them therefore is entitled to worship, though the worship will be of a different kind in each case, and will in each case be *finite*.

When, however, we turn from created things to consider God, the question of worship appears in a different light. God, the self-existent, self-sufficient, all-perfect Being, who depends upon nothing outside Himself for His existence while all other beings depend entirely upon Him for *theirs*, God the all-holy, all-wise and all-loving, is of *infinite* worth, and therefore is entitled by His very nature to a worship that knows no limits. It is not simply that His creatures owe Him homage in gratitude for His love in creating them, though this is, of course, perfectly true, but that His own nature, what He *is* quite apart from what He *does*, is supremely worthy and so supremely worshipful. In much the same way as a beautiful picture has a claim on our admiration just because it is beautiful, regardless of any benefit that we may have received from its existence, so God has a supreme claim on our worship just because He is infinite perfection, regardless of the benefits—boundless as those of course are—which He has showered upon us

That is, we realize the duty of worship, not by reflecting on God's goodness towards us and then deciding what we owe Him in return, but by reflecting on what He is in the perfection of His Being and then realizing—or vainly striving to realize—what that perfection is entitled to receive from us. And this supreme type of worship, which is due to God and to God alone, is what is described in Greek as *latreia* and what we usually know as *adoration*.

Once, however, we begin to recognize what kind of worship God's infinite worth demands, we can hardly fail to realize our total inability to give it to Him. Even the most perfect human being who has ever lived, even the whole human race from the beginning to the end of time, even the angelic hosts of heaven, cannot render to God that infinite honour to which His perfection entitles Him. So we find in all, or almost all, the races of mankind a profound consciousness that we can make a worthy offering to God only if, before we offer it to Him, God has Himself taken it and transformed it into something which is good enough to be offered to Him. This is at least one of the roots of the universal institution of *sacrifice*, in which, under an almost bewildering variety of forms, men offer to God different kinds of gifts which are consecrated to this use by some priestly ritual act.

The Only Perfect Worship

We who are Christians know, however, that none of the sacrificial acts of the pre-Christian religions were adequate offerings for man to make to God. The acts of consecration did not, as a matter of fact, bring about the required change in the gifts offered; all they could do was to testify to man's consciousness of the fact that his offerings were unfit and his sacrifice powerless to render to God that worship to which His worth entitles Him. For here is the paradox: God's infinite worth merits from His creatures an act of infinite homage; but an act of infinite homage could be given Him only by an infinite being. In fact, only God could render the worship which man is called upon to give, and this quite apart from the fact that man's universal sinfulness has debased to an unknown degree the value of even that limited worship that a created finite being might by its nature give. Are we to conclude, then, that no adequate act of worship can ever be offered to God?

We might be tempted to think so if we forgot that God

is not a bare monad but the ever-blessed Trinity and that, in the eternal and incomprehensible fulness of the life of the divine Being, God the Son is ever making to the Eternal Father that complete and infinite act of love and homage which the Father's perfection can justly claim. In the life of the Holy Trinity, then, a perfect and adequate worship is unceasingly performed. But still a question remains: Granted that the one perfect worshipper is God the Son, so that the Father does receive from the Son His due worship, is there still no *human* worship that has been or can be offered which is adequate to God?

And here we remember the glorious doctrine of the Incarnation, and how, by taking a human nature of a pure Virgin, God the Son, the eternal adorer of the Heavenly Father, was made man and lived a human life. And in that human nature, He not only made atonement for the sins of men, but also offered to the Father the only perfect offering of adoration that any human being has ever made. For, since He was man, it was a human offering, and, since He was God, it was an infinite one; furthermore, since He was sinless, it was an unspoilt offering. So in the life of perfect human obedience which God the Son lived upon earth, He offered to God the Father one coherent, adequate and unimpaired act of adoration, the only sufficient worship that had ever been offered by man to God. And as his earthly work drew near its close He could say, "I have glorified Thee on the earth; I have finished the work which Thou gavest Me to do."

And because in the Ascension Christ's manhood was not destroyed but was taken out of this visible realm into the realm of heaven itself, this perfect act of human worship has not ceased, but is going on for ever in heaven, Christ having, as the Epistle to the Hebrews puts it, entered in once for all into the Holy Place. So it is that St John describes in the Apocalypse how, when the door was opened in heaven, he saw not only the Eternal Father seated upon the throne surrounded by the hosts of heaven, but also the Lamb as it had been slain, who alone was worthy to open the Book.

Can We Share in This?

There is, then, a perfect and adequate human worship of God going on at this moment; it is going on in heaven, and it is being offered by the Ascended Christ in His glorified

human nature. This, however, still does not solve our problem. How are we imperfect sinful creatures living here on earth to make the offering which *we* owe to God ?

The answer is very simple, amazingly simple, but almost incredible in the depth of the divine condescension that it shows. It is nothing less than this: that Christ unites our human nature to His, so that we may be able to offer His offering or, rather, that He may offer it through and in us. For it is not a metaphor, but the literal truth, that the Church is the Body of Christ. Christ has only one Body, that which He took from His Mother the Virgin Mary, but that Body exists under various modes. As a natural Body it was seen on earth, died on the Cross, rose in glory on the first Easter Day and was taken into heaven at the Ascension; as a mystical Body it appeared on earth on the first Whit-Sunday, and we know it as the Holy Catholic Church; as a sacramental Body it becomes present on our altars at every Eucharist when, by the operation of the Holy Ghost and the priestly act of Christ in the Mystical Body, bread and wine are transformed into, and made one with, the glorified Body which is in heaven. Now we were made members of the Mystical Body in our baptism, when, as the teaching of the Prayer Book so clearly explains, we were washed clean from sin and made members of Christ. So our whole life as baptized members of the Christian Church is an act of worship, simply because we have been incorporated into the manhood of Christ and made parts of His Body. And just as the Incarnation, while appearing to us as a coming down of God the Son from heaven (Nicene Creed), is in its essence a taking up of manhood[1] into God (Athanasian Creed), so the consecration of the Eucharist, while appearing to us as a coming down of the God-man from heaven on to our altars, is really the taking up of this, that, and the other portion of bread and wine to become identified with the Body in heaven. Each Eucharist is, therefore, to borrow the phrase of the Apocalypse, a door opened into heaven, so that it is not a repetition of Christ's sacrifice but is identical with it. And because, as we have seen, Christ has not three bodies but one Body which exists in three modes (natural, mystical, sacramental), in offering the Eucharist we offer ourselves,

[1] "Manhood," not "a man." The latter would be the heresy called adoptionism.

or, to express it more accurately, Christ offers us as members of His Body. So we can see the force of St Augustine's words, " The mystery of yourselves is upon the altar."

And so it is that the Eucharist is the one perfect act of worship which we can offer to God.

Worship—in Life

So much, then, for worship—but what about life? Does all this theological cobweb-spinning mean that the Christian Religion is confined to the sanctuary? Have we all to become sacristy-minded, seeing no connexion between our worship and the world in which we live and work and amuse ourselves and die?

Quite the contrary, for the Body which appears sacramentally on our altars is the same Body which is at work mystically in the world and of which we are members. In a quite real sense, therefore, what we do in the world, at our work and in our play, is identical with the offering made on the altar and with the act of worship made by Christ in heaven. That is to say, for the Christian as a member of the Body of Christ, his whole life is liturgical, and there is a very true meaning in the motto which, one is told, is used by the young Catholic working men of France, " My bench is my altar, my factory is my Church."

There is a common view of the relation of worship to life whose falsehood should now be evident. This is the view according to which the main value of worship in church is that it enables one to do God's will more thoroughly in one's daily life. It cannot be too often emphasized that the Eucharist—as, indeed, all the Church's services of worship—is its own justification. It is the rendering to God of that of which He is worthy, and in that its whole reason lies. It would, however, be false—as the previous paragraph has emphasized—to suppose that the Eucharist has no relation to life, for both life and liturgy are acts of the Mystical Body and, as we have seen, the Mystical and the Sacramental Body are one.

Let us carry this thought a little further. If the one perfect act of worship is being offered by Christ in His glorified natural Body in heaven and if the mystical Body and the natural Body are identical, might it not seem that our act of worship is perfect because of our life in the Mystical Body without there being any need for the Sacramental

Body and the Eucharist? In answering this question it is necessary to recognize one great and all-important difference between the Body of Christ in its sacramental and mystical aspects.

The Sacramental Body is, in a quite definite sense, perfect, while the Mystical Body is not. All the sinlessness of Christ's glorified human nature is manifested in the Eucharist, wherein He communicates Himself to us and unites us to Himself in the integrity of His spotless humanity. The offering of Himself to the Father which He makes there is unsullied by any flaw. The Mystical Body, in contrast, is made up of sinful human beings whose incorporation into Christ, while being in the truest sense a new birth and a communication of Christ's own life, has not restored at one stroke all that sin had destroyed. In addition, the Mystical Body is woefully incomplete, for every man and woman that God has created on this earth is meant to be a member of it. In consequence, while, on the side of Him who is its Head, the Mystical Body is perfect and complete just because it is His, on the side of those who are its members it is maimed and undeveloped. It needs, therefore, for its healing and its continued growth, to be repeatedly brought into relation with that glorified natural Body which is its archetype, and it is precisely this that is done in the Eucharist, which is, as we saw above, the door opening from earth into heaven, the link between the natural and the Mystical Body of Christ. In the Eucharist, Christ, the great High Priest, offers His Body under its sacramental aspect, perfect and complete, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing, holy and without blemish, through that same Body under its mystical aspect of the Church, weak, sinful and unfinished. "I am black, but comely," speaks the bride in the Song of Songs, and the Bride who is Christ's Body may repeat the same words. She is black with the sins and failures of her members, but the mystery of herself is upon the altar, comely and fair and holy.

For the Christian, then, in the Mystical Body, life and worship are but two elements in one great act, the self-offering of Christ the God-man to the Father in heaven. Life itself is liturgical, for, whether the Christian serves God or whether he sins, he is acting as a member of the Body, and it is in the Eucharist that his life is given its true interpretation as not his act but the act of Christ in him.

There are three Latin phrases, pregnant with meaning, that are coming to be used in this connexion, and we can hardly summarize the thought of this article better than by quoting them. As Christians we are *filii in Filio*, sons in the Son, sons of God by adoption through our real incorporation into Him who is the Son of God by nature. The Church is *Totus Christus*, the Whole Christ, for, while in its natural aspect Christ's Body is complete and perfect as He took it from the Virgin Mother, in its mystical aspect it consists not only of Christ but of us. And, lastly, the Church's offering is made, not just by us who are its members or by Christ who is its Head, but by Head and members together, *membra cum capite*, to the glory of God the Everlasting Father.

E. L. Mascall.

MISCELLANEA

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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CORRESPONDENCE

CHRISTIAN FAITH AND NATURAL LAW

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

In his endeavours to employ "Catholic doctrine" and "Thomist theology" as a dialectical pole in the exposition of his own thought, Dr Reinhold Niebuhr may convey, I fear, a highly misleading impression of both. Indeed, I suspect that his own conclusions approximate more closely to Catholic doctrine as expounded by St Thomas than he supposes. Many passages from St Thomas might be quoted, but it should suffice to refer to Question 109 of the *Prima Secundæ*, wherein St Thomas treats *ex professo* of fallen man's capacities, to suggest the necessity for a few important correctives to Dr Niebuhr's exposition of "Thomism."

It will there be found that the statement that, "According to Thomistic doctrine, the Fall robbed man of a *donum superadditum* but left him with a [sic] *pura naturalia*, which includes a capacity for natural justice," is less than accurate. Indeed, any Catholic theologian must pronounce the doctrine that the Fall leaves man's *pura naturalia* intact to be rank heresy (see the Decrees of Trent on Original Sin and Justification). Rather may St Thomas's doctrine be summarized by saying that, "*Because* the Fall robbed man of the *donum superadditum* (*i.e.*, the supernatural God-relationship of grace operative in love), his *naturalia*

are seriously, though not wholly, *corrupta* (*loc. cit.*, article 2); and this to such an extent that he is (*a*) *totally* incapable of fulfilling the natural law in the *manner* ordained by God, and (*b*) incapable of fulfilling *all* its demands in any manner whatsoever " (*ibid.*, article 4). Moreover, precisely because man is deprived of supernatural grace, his very freedom is impaired to the extent that he is not able wholly to avoid sin (*ibid.*, article 8). It is therefore far from true that St Thomas holds that " the Fall does not seriously impair man's capacity for natural justice," still less can it be asserted that " Catholic theory assumes " that fallen man is in any way " completely in possession of ' natural justice.' "

Dr Niebuhr's main argument merits more consideration than is possible in the compass of a letter. But I would venture to suggest that in the Thomist doctrine of grace and nature, of the acquired and infused virtues, of natural and supernatural liberty, and especially of charity as *forma virtutum*, he would find anticipated much of the very doctrine he is looking for, though reached by other, and perhaps less devious, paths.

Yours, etc.,

VICTOR WHITE, O.P.

BLACKFRIARS, OXFORD.

AMERICA AND THE WAR

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

Professor Elliott's letter in your February number provides a pretext for introducing a question on which we have long been needing accurate and extensive information. I am not concerned with the interpretation of his book, whose value is no doubt independent of the question I am prompted to ask. Professor Elliott speaks for himself with regard to the issue of the war. I have no primary information and little secondary, but I conjecture that isolationist opinion in America is somewhat unfairly described in his remarks. (I speak of informed opinion, not of popular electioneering sentiment.) There is, I should judge, a considerable body of literary and critical thought which opposes intervention, not through a lust for peace-at-any-price, but through an inability to discern any radical preponderance of justice on either side of the frontier; and through a stubborn conviction that the preservation of culture for America and ultimately for Europe herself depends upon a refusal of entanglement in what they see as primarily a combat of rival imperialisms. That refusal, they admit, is itself dependent upon America's capacity for social reformation, and these people are still inclined to style themselves " marxist," though Finland and

the events that led up to it now compel them to distinguish that term from the opprobrious "stalinist." Now it seems to me, *pace* Professor Elliott, that that line of thought (which is, of course, predominantly secularist, though a reading of its representative journals, *The Southern Review*, *Partisan Review*, etc., suggests a necessary qualification of that epithet) is one with which American Christians could logically and conceivably ally themselves. The question I should like answered is, How far is that happening? At least, I should not like to go unchallenged his assumption that a Christian renascence in America is dependent upon a prior alliance with and intervention on behalf of the warring countries which he selects as representative of the Christian tradition in Europe. I am not defending or attacking the views of the isolationist Americans whose views I hesitantly expound; I am merely asking for information as to the actual disposition of intellectual forces in that country.

Yours faithfully,
W. R. JARRETT-KERR.

12, PARK TERRACE,
THORNABY-ON-TEES,
YORKS.

OLDER AND YOUNGER THEOLOGIANS

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR EDITOR,

By the time that this reaches you the Archbishop of York's article in the November issue may be forgotten, or the discussion upon it have taken a turn which will make what follows totally irrelevant. But that article spoke a very immediate word to myself, and at the risk of being out of date I should like to comment upon it.

"The younger generation" owes so much to the friendship and understanding of the Archbishop that I for one hesitate to rush into print upon the other side. But he has recognized that some of his young friends will do so, and it may be that we can get clearer wherein our differences lie.

I believe that my own reaction to the Archbishop's thought and that of his generation or tradition is not wholly individual. I am not a theologian, and find it impossible to indicate my dissatisfaction with it with any degree of precision. But I think it can be expressed by saying that I find the Archbishop's thought too neat, too completely a synthesis of experience. The Archbishop's world seems to cohere; mine seems to be full of jagged edges.

It is clearly fatuous and impertinent to accuse the Archbishop of "liberalism" *tout court*. It may be that the Archbishop finds or found that liberal attitude which was dominant before the

war less uncongenial than we do, but clearly there is something else. I am inclined to find that something in Plato, to whom the Archbishop is admittedly heavily indebted. I think, so far as my observation goes, that Plato is not so popular among "younger theologians" and their followers.

I should be inclined to connect the aversion from Plato (and together with him, from Greek or Greek-inspired philosophy in general) with the preoccupation of my generation with history. I remember that when I read "Greats" at Oxford I was bored by the philosophy (which I did not understand) and deeply interested in the history. The history spoke with some degree of immediacy to me and my world; the philosophy spoke of another world; and for the life of me I could not connect that world with mine. If a word of family history is not out of place, I should add that my father, although we share a very similar outlook, when he was reading "Greats" a generation before, had enjoyed the philosophy and been bored by the history.

I am myself convinced that the clue to the difference between "older" and "younger" (though age has often little to do with it) lies somewhere in the region indicated by the two questions—"After Liberalism—What?" and "What is the relation of philosophy to history, and of each of these to the Gospel?"

These are two questions to which theology is already addressing itself. It may perhaps be added that some light might be shed by a thorough examination of some of the "moderns" to find out (1) to what extent they retain a part of "liberalism," and what parts; (2) what is their attitude to philosophy and to history; and (3) what measure of agreement there is among them on these questions. As candidates for this examination I suggest Barth, Berdyaev, Maritain, Niebuhr, Brunner, Heim, Aulen, T. S. Eliot, V. A. Demant, T. E. Hulme, W. M. Horton, R. L. Calhoun, N. Micklem, C. H. Dodd, H. Kraemer, O. C. Quick. If possible, such an examination should be an attempt to establish the facts rather than to evaluate them.

Such an examination becomes the more pressing because many "older" people find it difficult to see what the "younger" find these theologians to have in common. To them, they are all as different as they can be. To me, though I recognize the differences, their fundamental agreements seem more important, though I should be hard put to it to say in any more precise form than that they all "speak to my condition" where others do not.

Yours sincerely,
DAVID PATON.

SCHOOL OF CHINESE STUDIES,
PEKING,
CHINA,
January 7, 1940.

"ODIUM THEOLOGICUM?"

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

I am asked to write on behalf of a group of subscribers to THEOLOGY whose main purpose in supporting it is their appreciation of the catholicity of its outlook, an elucidation of which was so admirably set forth in your editorial of August last. We regret to notice, therefore, that an unmistakable example of the narrower, sectarian interpretation of the term "Catholic," depreciated by you, has been allowed to dominate the review of Professor Raven's book, *The Gospel and the Church*, included in February's issue. *Odium theologicum* is the rock upon which a number of Christian publications have foundered and to-day, when Christianity itself is engaged in a life-and-death struggle, anything resembling its appearance in a journal such as this is inauspicious.

We do not write to champion Professor Raven's book; we confess to not having yet read it, and it may be that the views he expresses are one-sided. But at least they are the honest views of a Christian scholar whose prophetic insight is well attested and, we maintain, should be approached as such. The condemnation implied by the phrase, "It is high time that it was realized that a Chair at the University does not entitle a man to judge the word of God," is peculiarly *passé*: a Professor of Divinity must himself carry the Chair in these days.

We would therefore reiterate our plea that contributors to your pages should endeavour to differentiate between the man and his work and to treat with toleration fellow-Christians with whom they disagree, remembering always that the day of final harvesting is not yet.

I am,
Yours, etc.,
C. S. BELL.

GREEN RIDGE,
BRUDENELL AVENUE,
CANFORD CLIFFS,
BOURNEMOUTH.
February 27, 1940.

[We have received several letters to a similar effect. We regret that our desire to keep the pages of THEOLOGY open to vigorous and pungent theological criticism dulled on this occasion our sense of the distinction between that and personal offensiveness.—ED.

The Rev. G. B. Bentley writes as follows:

"It seems that my review of Professor Raven's book, *The Gospel and the Church*, has given offence to a number of people. I should like,

therefore, to give the assurance that I had no thought of delivering a personal attack upon Professor Raven, or of expressing theological or other *odium*. If the review gives that impression (and it has become evident that it does), my incompetence as a writer is to blame, and I apologize sincerely to Professor Raven himself, and to the Editor and readers of THEOLOGY, for the offending words.

" I must defend myself, however, against the charge of adopting a sectarian interpretation of the term ' Catholic.' I wrote simply as a member of the Church of England, which, as far as I know, has never abandoned the doctrine of the Fathers, that the Holy Spirit is the principal Author of Scripture. But if that doctrine is true, to pick and choose, to assert that some parts of the New Testament are less ' Christian ' than others, is implicitly to claim for human reason an authority superior to that of the Holy Spirit. The sentence in my review which has been singled out for special criticism—a Chair at the University does not entitle a man to judge the word of God—was merely an attempt (misguided, as it turns out) to express the truth that no position of intellectual eminence, however exalted, can confer upon a human being the right to treat the New Testament so. Surely many who would energetically disown the name of ' Catholic ' in a sectarian sense would agree on this point; for the Christian religion is based on a revelation, and to admit the possibility that the New Testament may misrepresent that revelation is to make it quite uncertain where truth is to be found."]

Note.—In the letter from the Rev. W. C. G. Proctor, published in March, the sentence on p. 221, " There is no distinction between biblical theology and systematic theology," should have read: " There is the distinction," etc.

PERIODICALS IN WAR-TIME

IT cannot be said of the literary periodical in England that the riper it gets the older it grows—nor do many first-class periodicals in this country die of old age. *Macmillan*, *Fraser's*, *Longman's* and *The Edinburgh Review*, whose pages I have sometimes turned in the archives of public libraries but whom I can never remember to have seen in their true war paint, are perhaps members of this band. I have, in fact, a dim remembrance of the *Edinburgh* taking pride of place in my father's study with the *Hibbert* and so late a comer as *The Modern Churchman*; but its funeral was celebrated before the ashes of these other four had quite grown cold. It did not die, like so much that was of value and seemed to be of an enduring nature, in the World War; but perished silent and alone, as though its cold and steely light must wither beneath these aftermath explosions.

Now another war is upon us—smaller in size but perhaps even more deadly in sinister possibilities that are by no means all connected with bombs; and culture has once more been a target for the guns. A few more periodicals of note have disappeared into oblivion—although some of them have affirmed, while

dying, that they hope to come to life again when the danger has overpassed. One such had already fallen sick. For it can hardly be doubted that the *Cornhill* had for some years been ailing and was declining with a Romantic *malaise* that had too often been mistaken by our forebears for rude health. To be robust and nothing more is to fail in the first duties of Man and to rise nowhere above the beasts; and it is to be hoped that if *Cornhill* emerges from oblivion in the days that are ahead it will be to glorify, and not to glut, its generation.

There is, however, another type of periodical to which war would seem to give birth—not because it is likely to flourish in a belligerent atmosphere but because both it and war are the fruit of mental crisis—the best and the worst that such a crisis produces. Even *Poetry*, which appeared a year before the present war, was like an oasis of thought in a wilderness of guns; but *Horizon*, which has celebrated its third issue, is the still small voice that has steadied our nerve and our inward aim since those guns have begun to speak. In poetry, fiction and the literary article, it is winning its way to the top of contemporary journalism —a good duel in a naughty world if ever there was one; but, if *Poetry* and *Horizon*, and those like them, are to weather all the blasts of the coming months, the dangers to them are likely to become more and more acute.

I do not refer to the dangers of economic collapse which attend us all now and literary journals, in a measure, at all times; but the more deadly dangers of the totalitarian type of culture to which the nation is fast heading and the war-mindedness by which we are steadily becoming victimized. There is a case (perhaps an unanswerable one) for censorship in war-time; but it puts a weapon into the hands of statesmen that can fall with unfailing approbation upon the just or the unjust. The literary periodical may expect an untimely death in days of peace; but in time of war it may fairly expect to be martyred. Are these two journals—with their slender religious philosophy and their fine edges of artistic sensibility—prepared for martyrdom? One wonders and one hopes. For the general deterioration of journalistic *morale* among the better-class periodicals since the war began is a cause for grief.

One notable exception to this is *The Guardian*. It is a periodical which has always possessed a certain solidity, even though at times when it has perhaps offered little else; but its columns have recently opened to admit some daring and original thought on topics which, while they acutely concern the moment, go far beyond it. I would especially mention the H. G. Wells controversy (which at one time threatened to grow bitter) over the usage of the word " God " and a recent provocative contribution by Canon Roger Lloyd on the problem of reparation and its application to war-time atrocities. Its articles by Dr Carpenter and Canon F. R. Barry have also been of more than

passing importance. It is over-bold to prophesy much at the present time; but I wager that, when most periodicals are unsaying all that they now say (just as they are now unsaying most of what they have said for the past twenty years) *The Guardian* will be able to maintain its policy unchanged—unless, of course, meanwhile it dies a martyr's death! For the execution of periodicals is a more humane thing than the execution of Poles—although both events have much the same result so far as the Kingdom of Heaven is concerned.

Ashley Sampson.

SURVEYS

(A) EASTERN ORTHODOXY

Procès-verbaux du premier congrès de théologie orthodoxe à Athènes. (Publiés par les soins du Président, Professor H. S. Alivisatos. Athens, 1939.)

HERE is clearly one of the most important theological publications of last year. The record of the Pan-Orthodox Congress of Theology held at Athens from November 29 to December 6, 1936, forms a large volume, of 540 pages; beautifully got up save for an abundance of misprints, "dedicated respectfully to the one Orthodox Church in the name of Orthodox theology." The report, though in part of the greatest interest, is rather unmanageably large and exhaustive. It is in four languages—French (the language used by the editors), German, modern Greek, English: the last was, alas! used for one address only, French for nine addresses, German for the remaining twenty-five. The Greek portion is mainly complimentary speeches and letters of greeting; but we could not spare the address by Archbishop Chrysostom at the closing dinner-party given by him to the members of the congress—a gem of wise and felicitous eloquence. The volume should deal a final deathblow to the "stiffened mummy" myth about the Orthodox church which still lingers even amongst otherwise educated English-speaking Christians. Another fallacious impression it should demolish is that there exists a complete cleavage between the adventurous and speculative theology of the Russian church and the backward and rigid conservatism of the older Orthodox churches. There is certainly a tension, but a wholesome tension overcome by the irenic centrality of certain broad-minded spirits whose outlook here predominates—*e.g.*, Professor Alivisatos, the president of the congress, Professor Zankov of Sofia and H.B. Archbishop Chrysostom. The resultant impression given by this veritable encyclopædia of modern Orthodox thought which forms the memorial of the congress is one of genuine comprehensiveness.

Participation in the congress was limited to professors of Orthodox theological faculties of university grade—*i.e.*, of the universities of Athens, Sofia, Belgrade, Bucarest, Chisinau, Cernauti, Warsaw and of the Russian Orthodox Theological Institute of Paris. It was opened and addressed by the King of Greece. It would be hard to overemphasize the present significance of the university of Athens to the Orthodox eastern church. After the wiping out by Bolshevism of the countless Orthodox academies and universities of Holy Russia it has a unique position, and it is rising to its opportunity. Restoration Greece is the home of a real renaissance of church life, as theological as it is practical, which more than fulfils the prophetic

hopes of Dean Church (*vide* his *Influences of Christianity on National Character*); witness the Zoe movement, the apostolic activity of which is directed by wise theological leadership. It had at its head until recently the most learned scholar and voluminous writer of the eastern church, the deeply mourned Archbishop Chrysostom Papadoulos, *ob.* October 25, 1938. R.I.P.

The success of the congress was doubtless due in large measure to the energy and outstanding personality of its president, Professor Hamilcar Alivisatos, of the university of Athens. The initial suggestion of holding it was his; and to him, perhaps, must be accredited what one might call its unionist preoccupation. He makes clear in his prefatory note that it was the gathering together of Orthodox theologians at ecumenical conferences on reunion that led to his initial proposal. Here at least is one splendid fruit of Stockholm and Lausanne. And the debt to the reunion movement is here in part at least repaid.

The President's opening address struck what was to prove the keynote of the conference. He touched on the causes of the decay of Orthodox theology after the sack of Constantinople: first, the gradual extension of the Turkish yoke, then the acceptance of modern confessions tainted by Roman Catholic and Protestant presuppositions. Orthodoxy now liberated must strengthen itself by returning to its patristic sources, a task it is empowered to perform by the aid of modern research and of the new methods of theological science. The *leitmotif* of the congress, it might be said, was the recognition of the need—not without western aid and at least in part for the benefit of western christendom—to eliminate from Orthodoxy its western accretions. Professor Bratsiotis (also of Athens) followed with a fine address on the fundamental principles of Orthodoxy. These are fidelity to tradition dynamically conceived; close adherence to the religious life and devotion of the early church; the mystical emphasis on the doctrine of Theosis; an otherworldly outlook, ascetic and eschatological, yet untouched by hostility towards social and cultural activity; its synodal and conciliar structure; its hierarchical framework combined with freedom from hierarchical absolutism; its ecumenicity; the controlling position of the liturgy. Father Bulgakov (Paris Theological Institute) gave an incisive statement of his views on the church which are well known to readers of the English translation of his book, the *Orthodox Church*. His exposition of the principle of "Sobornost" as being at once correlative to the hierarchical principle and corrective of its dangers (the hierarchy is in the church, not above it) and his view that an ecumenical council is not, by reason of the mere external fact of its ecumenicity, infallible, seem to have roused lively discussion.

The next subject was "Free Scientific Research in Theology in its Relation to Church Authority." Professor Vellas (Athens),

dealing especially with the problem of biblical criticism, affirmed that Orthodoxy has nothing to fear from sane scientific criticism. Both textual criticism and historico-critical research with regard to authorship are indispensable aids to true biblical study and are destined to be a source of illumination for the Orthodox church. Professor Antoniades (also of Athens) propounded the view that as Divine Revelation is contained in Holy Scripture and in Holy Tradition, it is the church, the guardian of the latter, who has the final decision as to the content and interpretation of Scripture. Professor Kartaschoff (Paris) also pleaded for true freedom in theological research combined with fidelity to tradition. He argued that as in natural science investigators are guided by their hypotheses and convictions, so a theologian should start with a certain orientation or world-view moulded by the living tradition of the church. Professor Cassian Besobrasoff (also of Paris) called attention to the waste of effort in the history of modern criticism caused by the neglect of tradition as the true starting-point of critical research. In fine, Orthodox principles with regard to free scholarship are the same as those of a Lagrange or a C. H. Turner, though their actual findings—to judge from samples given here—seem ultra-conservative to most Anglicans.

The papers which deal with "External Influences on Orthodoxy" are deeply interesting. Archbishop Chrysostom's study of "Influences in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" is massive and distinguished. Professor Dyovouniotis (Athens) noted that doctrines due to western influences ought not in every case to be rejected out of hand—there may be some which ought to be retained owing to their agreement with tradition and patristic teaching. He mentioned certain doctrines in particular as needing careful reconsideration—the indelibility of orders, the doctrine of transubstantiation and of the removal of original sin in baptism. Father Florovsky (Paris) dealt magisterially with the "Western Influences in Russian Theology," a subject on which he has recently written a brilliant book. This paper is in German. But a later paper of his on "Patristics and Modern Theology" is not only given in English, but begins with an extract from a seventeenth-century Anglican episcopal charge (by Bishop John Pearson of Chester), calling upon the clergy for a return to the study of patristic theology. Father Florovsky's eloquent reiteration of this counsel set us wondering whether *our* "younger theologians" are themselves treading in the "old pathes" of Greek patristic study worn by so many Caroline and Tractarian footsteps. "Hellenism," says Father Florovsky, "is a standing category of the Christian existence. . . . And thus any theologian must pass an experience of a spiritual hellenization (or rehellenization). . . . Many shortcomings in the modern developments of Orthodox churches" (may we

include Ecclesia Anglicana?) "depend greatly upon the loss of this hellenistic spirit. And the creative postulate for the next future would be like this: let us be more Greek to be truly catholic, to be truly Orthodox."

Here, no doubt, is good medicine for us Anglicans who for a generation or two have lost track of the patristic (and scriptural) doctrine of Theosis; who have substituted for this christological mystery a hybrid new science of spirituality called "mysticism"; who as a consequence are left oscillating between the views that Grace is a created quality and that it is identifiable with the Holy Spirit, a dilemma from which Saint Gregory Palamas[1] is waiting to give us exodus, a *via media* of deliverance and enrichment. But is rehellenization the main task of Orthodoxy? There is need of proportion. Along with other portions of the book this address recalls the remembrance that on Catholic Calvary hung a title written in three languages, "Hebrew and Greek and Latin." The Greek was central. But the Latin was also there. And it is the King's own Hebrew that has the primacy—only over this title can the others fittingly declare the sovereignty of the thorn-crowned Head. For it is Jerusalem that is the "mother of us all," and her heritage alone can hold in equilibrium Greek theorizing and Latin juridicism. This book by no means wholly assuages one's doubts as to whether Orthodox theology is yet as biblical as it means to be.

What about latinization, or perhaps we may say relatinization, if it is true (as one believes) that the genius of the Roman Empire has been divinely empowered to have indirect but important influence on the New Testament itself? Is it not possible that a policy of emulation or indeed of simple imitation of western Christendom in certain practical ways will be the best compensation for the wrongs the west has inflicted? The consciousness evinced by some speakers at the congress that there is much to be learnt about the ordering and extension of church life from the Latin west (despite its doctrinal errors and diseases) is a feature of this report full of the richest promise.

Various administrative questions of this practical kind came up for preliminary theological investigation. First the question of the convocation of an ecumenical council. All who addressed the conference on this matter agreed that it is out of the question in the present situation. To begin with, there is no important outstanding dogmatic question to necessitate and to justify such

[1] For the work of Saint Gregory Palamas see Father Basil Krivosheim's fine treatise published in four parts in *Eastern Churches Quarterly*, 1938. For Eastern repudiation of the idea of grace as created (the norm of Western doctrine) see Mme Lot Borodine "L'Anthropologie Théocentrique de l'Orient Chrétien," *Irénikon*, January, 1939. "La Doctrine de la Grâce et de la Liberté dans l'Orthodoxie Gréco-Orientale," *Œcumenica*, April and July, 1939.

a step. There would in any case be need of long and careful preparation which should include more thorough education of Orthodox clergy. Further, there could be no question of calling a council which like that of the Vatican would be ecumenical only in name. Hence there must be careful consideration of the exact position of the Latin church, the Anglican church and the Protestant churches in relation to the Holy Orthodox church. Some hard things are said about Anglicanism in an address sent to the congress by Professor Sesan of Cernauti. " The bulk of Anglicans is still immersed in Lutheranism and even in part deep in Calvinism." (A Rumanian theologian should know better by this time.) This misleading statement is followed by an almost equally inaccurate account of relationships between Anglicans and the Russian theologians of Paris. It is a pity the professor was absent from Athens and so could not be corrected by those who knew the facts. There was a discussion on the means of reaching agreement between the several Orthodox churches outside a general council; Professor Alivisatos stated the view that such questions as the reform of the calendar, the date of Easter, the regulation of liturgical texts, etc., could be decided by the ancient method of correspondence or the sending of delegates. The questions so treated should be of a general nature, requiring solution by the whole church; no decision should be taken in these matters by particular churches individually, and the regulations drawn up should be confirmed eventually by a general council. The question of the codification of canon law as well as that of the revision of the liturgical texts was also discussed. The various tasks involved in the " interior and exterior mission of the church " were analysed in the light of the present situation. The need of overcoming certain indigenous defects due to long-standing oppression under foreign yoke—*e.g.*, relics of pagan superstition, widespread ignorance of certain aspects of the faith, etc.—was frankly recognized: likewise the need of resisting the pressure of western influences—secularism, freemasonry, Roman proselytism. The call for a revival of missionary activity, especially in the Near East, was also sounded. On the relationship of the church to social questions one address reveals an attitude very akin to that of Charles Gore. There is much illumination for a western reader in Professor Zenkowsky's (Paris) address on the " Church and Culture."

A divergence of opinion appears on the subject of " Church and State." Professor Alivisatos upholds the advantages of Cæsaro-papalism as seen at its best in the golden age of Justinian. Professor Zankov is dissatisfied with Cæsaro-papalism and contends that not this but the principle of " symphony between Church and State " (theoretically formulated indeed by Justinian but violated by him in practice) is the way of Orthodoxy. It

seems to be a matter of agreement amongst Orthodox theologians that it is a superficial conception of the meaning of the church's theocratic nature that has dominated western catholicism. The sin of the western church (its violation of the principle of liberty) first provoked the rupture with western culture and now is active outside the borders of the church in the form of totalitarianism.

Certain resolutions were passed, among them the following: The published report of the congress shall serve as a basis for further discussion by future congresses. The congress registered its desire for the codification of the sacred canons, for the revision of the text of the liturgical books, for the publication of an international Orthodox theological journal, and for closer co-operation between the Orthodox theological faculties. It recommended a common day of prayer for all the theological faculties (the feast of the three hierarchs, January 30). It expressed its will to collaborate "in an Orthodox spirit" in the ecumenical movement. It recorded its deep sympathy with the persecuted church of Russia.

GEOFFREY CURTIS, C.R.

(B) AMERICA AND THE "NEW" THEOLOGY

THE discussion, which has been carried on in THEOLOGY and elsewhere in England, on the difference between the older theologians and the newer school of thinkers about God, His revelation and the "liberal" interpretation of it, is not without its interest in America. Indeed, on this side of the water there is as keen a controversy (or perhaps it would be kinder to say, as lively a discussion) on this subject as in the mother-country. Naturally, the treatment has been along somewhat different lines; but the divergence in attitude is quite as real, and the assumption of a fundamental fissure is as often implied.

Once again, however, as this writer suggested about the whole theological movement in America in a survey in THEOLOGY in January, 1939, the Episcopal Church has not been so seriously affected as some of the protestant denominations. Even among them, it is not a matter of the old fundamentalist-modernist controversy, or at least not that controversy in its familiar terms. Rather, it appears to be a difference between the religious realists or naturalists, who range all the way from men like Professor Macintosh of Yale Divinity School to Professor Wieman of Chicago University, and the neo-supernaturalists (as they are often called) who have won the attention of many of the younger men. In this latter group are Professors Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr, and their followers in seminaries, colleges and churches all over the country.

This problem of religious realism and neo-supernaturalism in a way resolves itself into the old question of whether or not a natural religion, and with it a natural theology, may be assumed to exist apart from the religion of relevation, or specifically biblical theology. Some of the realists would go to extremes and deny revelation in any proper sense at all, but these are few and tend to become fewer; some of the neo-supernaturalists are rash enough to denounce reason, deride natural religion in any form, and insist upon a strict (and, we might suggest, therefore unintelligible) Biblicism. Between these two groups, there are all sorts of positions, with a movement on the whole towards the right in these present times, although such a recent book as Professor Julius S. Bixler's *Religion for Free Minds* may do something to stem the tide. The distinguished Harvard theologian, of rather too Unitarian sympathies, takes a firm stand for the values of liberalism, and directs some very acute criticisms at the Barthians, the neo-Barthians, the followers of Tillich and others of the neo-supernaturalist school.

Perhaps the most sensible discussion of the subject (and that by an Anglican) is from the pen of Dr R. C. Miller of California, a teacher in an Episcopalian theological college on the Pacific coast. Dr Miller, writing in the January, 1940, number of *The Anglican Theological Review*, urges that the naturalist or realist position, which maintains that God can be empirically known (as Wieman and Macintosh would argue) as at least the tendency towards value or personality in the universe, and that from this one may deduce other and richer truths about Him, is in a sense exactly the modern equivalent of the ancient natural theology; and upon it, the facts of Christian revelation supervene, being in a line with, consistent with, and fulfilling, the implications of the natural order.

This entire discussion, while it has interested, and to some degree affected, the thinking of American Episcopalian scholars, is not so significant for them as another question which has recently arisen in this country. This is whether or not there can be a genuine Christian humanism. The disturbed international situation, the world-war and its repercussions, economic insecurity, the breakdown of much traditional morality, and the lessening of respect for institutional religion, have provoked their inevitable reaction in a view that the Church and its theology are, so to say, " away from society " and are above the disputes of the market-place. American thought can hardly go the full length of the older Barthianism; the psychology of progress is still too much with us, and the zest for life is ever found among a people who still have vast areas to develop and a real culture to " grow." At the same time, disillusionment and doubt are playing their part; and there is now a number of men who seem to doubt, if not the possibility, at any rate the durability, of a

Christian humanism. The writer may misjudge him, but a recent paper read by Professor Pottle of Yale seemed typical of this movement; in an address to a large group of clergy, this distinguished professor of English literature and devout churchman spoke for many when he said that Christianity and the Church could never hope to win the world, their victory being *only* in a supernatural realm.

On the other hand, some who are quite prepared to admit, and, indeed, to stress, the evils of our society (and to be somewhat more radical than the " defeatists " in their idea of the way to remedy them), feel that the truth of a Christian humanism must be safeguarded, since only thus can the widest implications of Christianity itself be safeguarded. These thinkers are firm in holding that the creation of a Christian culture is part of the work of a Church which holds to a God of all truth, all life, all nature, all the world, a cosmic God who has acted for a cosmic redemption. Jacques Maritain is their prophet; but they are also influenced by the writings of Dr Oldham in England, and by some of the less known but clear thinkers in America, like Dr John Bennett, Dr Joseph F. Fletcher and others.

Still another point of disagreement, and one which is causing pain to many men of the younger generation, is the apparent revival in some church quarters (and among both old and young) of a theological rigidity harking back to pre-" modernist " days. With Mr Mascall's call for a return to dogma the more " liberal " (to use that question-begging adjective) men would agree; we need, they would say, a dogmatic religion, but in America at least there is a danger that this may lead to a view which negates the real gains of the older period of liberalism. To disregard critical conclusions about the Bible, to disdain the scientific contribution to our understanding of the universe, to reject the truth in contemporary philosophical thinking, and in brief to present Christianity as a set of dogmas which are not subjected to the test both of historical continuity *and also* the test of rationality and validity by the inquiring reason—this is a tragic refusal to learn the lesson of the past.

Against the " neo-fundamentalists," whether Anglo-Catholic or Protestant, it would be contended that there are central and peripheral beliefs; and it would be held that the return to dogma does not necessarily imply the attempted restoration of the whole *corpus* of traditional theology so much as the clear and forceful statement of the essential truths of that theology in our idiom. For this reason the neo-Thomism of the continent has attracted the men in question, since they find here a contact with our own age, but they would stress the " neo " in contrast with the conservatives who are to-day prepared to accept the Thomistic scheme or its Reformation equivalent almost in their completeness.

Unfortunately, in some places (especially in Anglo-Catholicism and among certain non-Anglican groups) there has recently developed not only the theology but also the temper exhibited in the notorious English manifesto of a few years ago, which attacked biblical criticism, modern theological study, and the attempt to state Christianity in other than the usually accepted terms, and called all of these things disloyalty to the faith, " the reduction of Christianity," and the perversion of the great tradition. It is too early to say how potent this revived obscurantism may prove to be; but it is at least worth noting that concomitant with it has come a renewed " liberal " insistence upon the gains of the past hundred years; and in Catholic circles in the Episcopal Church a vigorous attempt (shown in several new books) to maintain a truly critical, yet also integrally sound, Catholicism.

If one's own judgment is of any interest, it might be said that the total situation will probably issue in a growing recognition of the value of natural theology, as emphasized by the religious realists, and the recognition that such an empirical approach may be consistent with a firm hold upon the specific differentia of Christian belief; a clearer understanding of the decisive nature of the Christian gospel, as declaring God's definitive act for man—the contribution of the neo-supernaturalists; a tension, perhaps lasting over many years and with the issue still in doubt at the present, between those who hold to the possibility of a Christian humanism in the grand tradition, and those who would " flee to the mountains "; and a very gradual, perhaps even bitterly fought, retreat by the " neo-fundamentalists " in the face of honest insistence upon the sheer necessity of facts and their acceptance without fear or prejudice. And once again, it may be said that the need for some corporate, traditional, institutional, and yet modern-minded (not in the cheap sense, but in the sense of being relevant to modern needs, and so expressed that a groping twentieth-century America can understand) presentation of Christianity is more and more felt; and the preaching and teaching of such a gospel meets with a surprisingly cordial welcome in all classes of society. That is no test of truth, to be sure; but, on the other hand, if the gospel is proclaimed fearlessly and without reduction of its demand upon life and upon allegiance of mind, it is not without significance that it is heard gladly.

W. Norman Pittenger.

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The " neo-fundamentalist " reaction is illustrated, so far, only by some occasional articles in religious journals, unobtainable in England at the moment.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE ART OF PREACHING, 747-1939. By Charles Smyth. S.P.C.K. 8s. 6d.

This book contains a practical survey of preaching in the Church of England, from the middle of the eighth century to the present time. The first purpose of this survey is to help parish priests to improve their own sermons by a study of the methods of preachers in the past; its second purpose is to help professional historians.

In his introductory chapter, the author urges that parochial duties well done are normally the foundation of good preaching. "Any man can preach, and preach effectively, who reads his Bible and says his prayers and loves his people: and no man can preach effectively who does not read his Bible and say his prayers and love his people" (p. 3).

The survey is divided into three periods. The first period covers the Middle Ages. The second period runs from the Reformation to the end of the eighteenth century, and the chapter allotted to it is entitled "The Triumph of Tillotson." The third period covers the nineteenth century and after.

For the first period Canon Smyth found his survey ready to hand in the *Forma Prædicandi* (1322) of Robert de Basevorn, and the *De Modo Componendi Sermones cum Documentis* (c. 1340) of Thomas Waleys, O.P., Master in Theology of the University of Oxford. From these two books he has compiled an excellent analysis of the scheme of the medieval sermon in vogue at Oxford in the fourteenth century.

This analysis of the skeleton of the medieval sermon is followed by an instructive and entertaining discussion of the use of illustrations which made that sermon attractive. The medieval preachers, especially the friars, loved to astonish their audience, and illustrate their theme, with exempla drawn from natural wonders and from the habits of odd and often legendary animals. The reader will find here the bear, the adder, the tortoise, the hedgehog, the pelican, the parrot, the eagle, the elephant, called upon by their nature and habits to illustrate Gospel truth.

"Familiar or fantastic, the whole animal kingdom lies ready to the preacher's hand" (p. 71).

When the medieval period has been left behind, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the author has found it hard to drive a road through the mass of material which presented itself to him. After commenting on the sermons of Latimer, Andrewes and Jeremy Taylor, he shows how the influence of these great preachers yielded to that of the more sober Tillotson. This reasonable divine imitated in religion that plainness of language which the Royal Society found desirable in natural science. His sermons, from which some extracts are quoted, speak of

the moral part of religion in sober language; their construction is simple; and the parochial clergy found that they had the singular merit of being easy to plunder, curtail, or reproduce.

The medieval scheme of sermon construction reappeared in the writings of Charles Simeon, who was acquainted with it through the work of the French Huguenot, Jean Claude. The reader will find on pp. 183-195 an excellent and instructive analysis of Claude's essay on sermon manufacture. Among many extracts from the work of nineteenth-century preachers, the sermons of Augustus Hare are quoted to show the value of illustrations; those of F. W. Robertson are mentioned with warm approval; and those of Newman are handled with needless severity.

Perhaps no parish priest will read this book without finding something which will help him. But it is, inevitably, a mass of quotations, and requires close attention and perhaps something of a scholarly taste, for the proper appreciation of it. It is enlivened in all its parts by well-chosen wit and humour; here is one example from p. 87:

" I have known a fable by Saki introduced with some effect at the conclusion of a sermon upon Riches, admittedly to a somewhat eclectic congregation: 'As Reginald said to the Duchess, " One must specialize in these days. Which reminds me of a man I read of in some sacred book who was given a choice of what he most desired. And because he didn't ask for titles and honours and dignities, but only for immense wealth, these other things came to him also." " I am sure," said the Duchess, " you didn't read about him in any sacred book." " Yes," said Reginald; " I fancy you will find him in Debrett."' "

A. C. Scupholme.

The March of Literature. By F. M. Ford. Allen and Unwin. 16s.

It is with very high regret that one realizes that this is the last book by Ford Madox Ford. As far as possible, " the present writer " (as he himself so often says) has read all the things he wrote—a few, most fortunately, remain. But no book, of all his, could be more suitable to be his last; in none could his immense knowledge, his high judgment, his eccentricities, his moving and occasionally clumsy style, display themselves more enormously. It is a volume of eight hundred and fifty pages, roughly three hundred and fifty thousand words. It covers the period from Confucius to Miss Dorothy Richardson and Mr René Behaine (though, indeed, they are exceptions; it would be truer to say Dostoieffsky). From the time that Europe begins, it covers Europe; but that means certain things. It means Homer; it most certainly does not mean Virgil. It means

Shakespeare; it most certainly does not mean Milton. It means Villon and *le moyen âge*. It means Conrad. And Richardson. And Gibbon. " Unless a man has read Gibbon he scarcely merits the name of an Englishman, an Anglo-Saxon, or even of a man at all." That is undoubtedly the way to talk about Letters.

There is a story here of how Mr Lascelles Abercrombie wrote an article in praise of Milton which appeared in the *Times Literary Supplement*. And how Mr Ezra Pound thereupon challenged him to a duel in Hyde Park. But the police intervened, and Mr Pound left England. I do not know if the story is true, and my heart is torn, for, though I should have seconded Mr Abercrombie, I should have felt—then—that Mr Pound was also to be backed. Then. Now it is all different, for the great traditional John Milton has been overthrown, and the great poet John Milton may at last come into his own, with all his divine lightness and tenderness and accuracy of knowledge of the human heart. Unless, however, one understands that, were duels permissible, one would risk one's life on such things much more willingly than for most (even of those commonly thought more important), one has not begun to understand Letters at all.

This, then, is the first thing about the book—a proper appreciation of its great subject. The second is a proper sense, and a way of conveying it, of the hundred or more different groups of writers into which European literature is, as it were, divided, and those in their habits and actions, and those also not only the very great. Thus, in speaking of Archbishop Warham, Mr Ford says: " He subsidized impartially both Calvin and Erasmus," and goes on to remind us that in the village of Aldington in Kent there is a building " that Erasmus is still supposed to haunt," having once been its rector. Or again there is an account by Ford Madox Brown of Dickens at Lady Cowper-Temple's, sitting slumped in an armchair, rather tired looking, but " with authoritative eyes. Like a great general." By which may go the other, more strictly literary, comment that " the great quality of Dickens is that his own class existed for him till the day of his death." And, almost two thousand years earlier, Virgil " enjoyed among the popular a popularity such as is to-day reserved for the stars of Hollywood."

The making of Greece, the civil wars of Rome, the breakdown of Rome and the Dark Ages, the Reformation and the wars of Religion, all these, with plagues and pestilences innumerable, have passed over Europe, and still the great operation of Letters has gone on. It is older than the Faith. Christendom enlarged, altered, elucidated its preoccupations, but it was there before Christendom. The sense of it, in a book like this, is overwhelming. It outlasted such things as the awful moments when,

" contrary to law and the dictates of humanity," certain medieval generals—did what? Employed against Bertran de Born " devilish new instruments that, hurling stone balls both with fire and flame against his castle walls, brought them down." The law and the dictates of humanity are outraged, tyrants control authors, Europe rocks with grief and pain, but nothing has interfered with the continuance of that operation, nor (under God) will.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

ST CLAIR DONALDSON. By C. T. Dimont and F. de Witt Batty. Faber and Faber. 12s. 6d.

Bishop Donaldson's influence upon the growth of the Anglican Communion cannot be fully weighed yet, because it moved not only in the realm of organization and of policy but also in that of prayer, in particular in the Jerusalem Chamber Fellowship of Prayer, and such influence goes on. This does not mean that he was not a statesman, an able administrator, a wise chairman of many important committees besides the Missionary Council of the Church of England. He was all these. As Archbishop of Brisbane from 1904 to 1921 he deeply affected the progress of the Australian Church; as Bishop of Salisbury from 1921 to 1935, and as Chairman of the Missionary Council from 1922 to 1933, his wisdom, wide vision, and care about fundamental principles helped the working out of important new policies, and the clarification of the Church's mind on a number of issues. Nevertheless what was needed during the period between the end of the first Great War and the beginning of the second was the mental and spiritual acceptance and digestion of the fact that the Church of England is now the Anglican Communion, not an insular but a world-wide Church. If this fact has been recognized at all it is in part due to Bishop Donaldson, who inaugurated the Jerusalem Chamber Fellowship, and inspired the World Call campaigns, to this end. " It will only be when Churchmen think in terms of the Church at large that the Church's own message to the nation will be clear and powerful," he wrote in a Pastoral in 1922. A *metanoia* on such a scale as this is a sign of the working of the Holy Spirit, and Bishop Donaldson was continuously seeking to be open to His promptings throughout his ministry.

The story of this ministry is told in this biography by Canon Dimont, Bishop de Witt Batty and Bishop Allen, with contributions by others who served with the Bishop in one capacity or another; there is an intimate and delightful sketch of him as a friend by Miss Edith Olivier; the book begins with a Foreword by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and ends with his Grace's words at the funeral. There are adequate and well-chosen extracts from

sermons and speeches, enlivened by revealing quotations from his diary. In an address at a wedding in Salisbury he said: " We hold up in prayer before God for you, that you may win love by the grace and beauty of your character . . .; that you may stand for righteousness and purity by the strength with which you hold to your ideals, above all, that by the steadfastness of your own Christian life you may witness in a bewildered world for the things unseen and eternal." Such were the marks of his own life, from which proceeded his continuing influence in the Church. The book is an historical record of a great servant of the Anglican Communion.

J. A. Ramsbotham.

Pages from the Past. By H. A. L. Fisher. Oxford University Press. 10s.

In this interesting volume, the Warden of New College has collected fifteen addresses, articles, and book reviews, some of them of essentially ephemeral interest, but all alike distinguished by a polished academic style. The most substantial—it was the Raleigh Lecture for 1928—is a survey of the Whig Historians in general, and, in particular, of those two noble kinsmen, Lord Macaulay and Sir G. O. Trevelyan: had it been written since the publication of Sir Charles Firth's *Commentary on Macaulay's History of England*, it would no doubt have reflected more severely on Macaulay's deliberate pandering to the Covenanting Legend in Scottish history. Another historical essay, somewhat absurdly entitled " The Real Oxford Movement," describes the sudden and transitory outburst of scientific curiosity and experiment at Oxford under the Commonwealth (1649-59). " If Napoleon had Escaped to America " is a pleasing, if inferior, companion picture to Professor G. M. Trevelyan's " If Napoleon had Won the Battle of Waterloo " in *Clio, A Muse*. Three personal studies (Morley, Snowden, Balfour) and an essay, dignified and reticent, on " Politicians," reflect the writer's experience of public life. But of all the essays in this volume, the most successful are " A College Progress " (written in 1896), which forms a charming epilogue to Mrs F. R. Goodman's *Reverend Landlords and their Tenants : Scenes and Characters on Winchester Manors after the Restoration*; and a good, shrewd, hard-hitting onslaught on Mr Bertrand Russell's *Education and the Social Order* (" A Philosopher's Paradise "), which is as exhilarating to read as it must have been to write. Dr Fisher's summary of the recent history of Russia (p. 206) has something of the same incisive quality: " No country with a sound political education could have fallen so low or thrown away such splendid advantages: but the Tsarist tyranny educated no politicians, and when the defeated Tsarist armies threw themselves in a paroxysm of rage and lust upon the

helpless body of their country, a small body of doctrinaire Communists, inspired by an exploded mid-Victorian philosophy, aided by army deserters, and employing the traditional Tsarist weapon of a secret and tyrannical police, erected a new despotism in the heart of chaos." Amid the strife of the nations, this "modest sheaf of occasional papers" indeed fulfils its purpose of "conveying a gentle invitation to human studies and a rebuke to the menacing barbarism of our age."

C. H. S.

MAHATMA GANDHI. Essays and Reflections on his Life and Work. Presented to him on his seventieth birthday, October 2, 1939. Edited by S. Radhakrishnan. George Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d. net.

This is an unusual book. There are more than fifty contributions. They vary from short simple tributes from Lord Halifax and Laurence Binyon to general reflections on subjects illuminated by Mr Gandhi's life and teaching. An appendix gives extracts from his essays and speeches.

The publishers are right in regarding the book's appearance as timely. For while it is the study of a very interesting and important character, it is still more a presentation of the principles and ideals for which he stands. More than that: it is the kind of presentation which will confirm the faith even of those who disagree with this or that aspect of the case it presents. In the words of one of Mr Gandhi's former opponents, General Smuts, "men like him redeem us all from a sense of commonplaceness and futility, and are an inspiration to us not to be weary in well-doing."

"The challenge of Mr Gandhi to our world," writes one contributor, "is just this: Is there not another way of resisting evil and righting wrongs than the way of brute force and the terrible weapons of modern warfare? And if there is, are not those who care for humanity bound to seek and follow it?" With this, I think, many of the contributors to this volume would agree, and they would regard the volume as a further presentation of this challenge.

But besides this main and topical interest there are other aspects of the book which give it additional value. It is instructive to note how the stimulant of Mr Gandhi's character and creed moves different contributors in different ways. One is moved to an exposition of Hindu thought, another to a portrait of "the reasonable man," another to the study of poverty and sanitation. Each finds encouragement for his own pursuit, and provides good data for the psychologist. Indeed, many different kinds of student will find this a good source-book—historians, biographers, political scientists, moralists, and

not least, perhaps, the student of religion. It is valuable for the study of the religious consciousness in general and the study of Hinduism in particular.

For Mr Gandhi is (to quote the editor) "an essentially religious person. . . . Whatever opinion we may hold of God, it is impossible to deny that He means something of supreme importance and absolute reality to Gandhi."

"There is," Mr Gandhi has written, "an indefinable, mysterious power that pervades everything. I feel it though I do not see it. It is this unseen power which makes itself felt and yet defies all proof because it is so unlike all that I perceive through my senses. It is proved not by extraneous evidence but in the transformed conduct and character of those who have felt the real presence of God within. Such testimony is to be found in the experiences of an unbroken line of prophets and sages in all countries and climes. To reject this evidence is to deny oneself. It can never be a matter for argument. If you would have me convince others by argument, I am floored. But I can tell you this—that I am surer of His existence than of the fact that you and I are sitting in this room. I can also testify that I may live without air and water but not without Him. You may pluck out my eyes, but that will not kill me. You may chop off my nose, but that will not kill me. But blast my beliefs in God and I am dead."

It is a faith which leads him to accept and welcome other men of faith. "I do not regard any of the great religions of the world as false. . . . A liberal education should include, as I have put it, a reverent study of all other faiths" (p. 339).

At the same time Mr Sarma is justified in claiming Mr Gandhi distinctively as "a great prophet of Hinduism," and it is instructive to note how emphatically he affirms his Hindu loyalty and how thoroughly this imbues his teaching and directs his attitude. He is at once an illustration of the "open hospitality of the Hindu mind," and also of the tenacity of Hindu loyalty. And this loyalty inspires a responsive devotion in others so that (again to quote Mr Sarma) the claim is made: "His gospel of Satygraha, as he himself says, is only an extension and an application of the fundamental Hindu doctrine of Ahimsa to all national and international problems. No other country in the world than India has the requisite religious background for the extending and the implementing of this great doctrine" (p. 267). The result is a body of testimony, partly from Mr Gandhi himself, partly from his friends, which carries the reader into the very heart and atmosphere of Hinduism, and may do considerably more to help him to understand that atmosphere than many books written more expressly for the purpose.

R. H. L. Slater.

THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE. By Hubert Doms. Translated by George Sayer. Sheed and Ward. 7s. 6d.

Seven years ago it was prophesied by an eminent theologian and dignitary that the inevitable crisis in the relation of Church and State in this country would be evoked on the question of marriage: and though other questions (such as Pacifism) seem in the intervening years to have assumed a major importance, yet there are signs that not merely the Church's relations to the State but her defence of the community itself will be decided on the Christian doctrine of marriage. For the institution of marriage is the natural condition of social cohesion: the family is the primary unit of human society, antecedent to individual and nation alike.

It is regrettable, therefore, that in face of the menace of social disruption throughout Europe, which the artificial rivets of State control cannot arrest for long, so much dispute of theory and diversity of practice has been allowed to continue within the Church herself; and, above all, that no systematic attempt has been made to explore the anthropological basis of marriage in relation to moral theology. Dr Doms would not claim to have achieved, or even attempted, quite this; but he has at least prepared the ground for it in this book. Its original publication in German aroused widespread interest and criticism such as is rarely given to a technical work of theology; and its translation into English has been awaited with impatience. Mr Sayer is to be congratulated for his fine achievement in this: it is a marked improvement upon the French version current in this country hitherto. A nice balance has been struck between fidelity to the highly technical German and a free and readable English; that the task was not easy is shown by the necessity of coining such an uncouth neologism as "Two-in-oneship" for the German *Zweieinigkeit*, but the degree of success achieved is commendable.

Dr Doms's thesis is that discussion of marriage hitherto has been concentrated excessively, and misleadingly, upon the ends of marriage, and that agreement between different theories can never be reached on such terms. He sets out therefore to examine first the intrinsic nature (*Sinn*) of marriage—the "Meaning" which entitles the book—and then to relate this with those ends or purposes (as, for example, procreation) with which we are familiar. This intrinsic nature or meaning he finds in the essential unification of the partners—that through physical intercourse they may achieve meta-physical unity (the epithet is hyphenated to avoid confusion with the technical philosophical sense); the marriage act is essentially the giving of one person to another in the most real mode and fullest degree possible to incarnate beings. Since men are by nature spiritual, their intercourse can never be merely for the satisfaction of

physical instincts: it has even on the natural plane a sacramental character, producing through outward and sensible means an inward and spiritual effect. Dr Doms illustrates this proposition by reference to the biological character of the act: from the fact that generation is an *accidental*, not essential, result of intercourse, and that even to-day, after thousands of years of research, the conditions of conception remain unknown, he argues that " the very nature of the sexual act emphasizes its personal importance as distinct from its biological purpose . . . the procreation of children is rather the natural *result* of the act of marital union . . . and we shall be making a mistake if we subordinate the act in its primary contact to procreation, because in a very great number of circumstances this purpose cannot in fact be fulfilled."

But though it is wrong to regard, and to present, marriage as designed primarily for procreation, Dr Doms brings the full weight of his argument against any practices of artificial prevention of generation: both on biological and psychological grounds he demonstrates the harmfulness of such practices, but finds the chief objection on theological grounds. " Since men cannot control the processes which follow on the act, we have to recognize that nature itself imposes certain limits on human rights. Once the seed is deposited in the body of the woman the partners cease to have any determining rights over the essential movements of the seed, as instituted by the Creator. . . . Artificial prevention in the procreative process is evil not so much because living matter is wasted or because another person's right to existence is violated, as because of the voluntary attack on vital processes in which we have no right to interfere. The sin is not that against a human person who does not yet exist, but rather against the sovereign rights of God Himself." Similarly, whilst he tends to discard the conventional arguments for the indissolubility of marriage from the need to safeguard children during the long period of their adolescence, Dr Doms admits of no compromise in this matter, on the ground that indissolubility is indispensable for the true spiritual unification of the partners.

It is here that we are shown the link of the natural with the supernatural. " Because of original sin, it is difficult for man to comprehend the dignity and grandeur of the human person, unless illumined by revelation and grace—which explains the facility with which polygamy and divorce are excused among non-Christians." Grace is needed, however, not merely to display the dignity of human personality, but also to realize it: and since marriage is a divinely ordained mode of such realization, it is seen to be a sacrament in the full Christian sense. The unification of the partners becomes instrumental of the union of each with God: it is in giving themselves wholly each to the other that they achieve sanctification. Marriage is thus

analogous to Holy Communion, inasmuch as each produces a spiritual effect by physical interpenetration . . . the difference being that, whereas in marriage the partners remain in the last resort individual, yet in Holy Communion the communicant is actually incorporated in Christ.

To this full examination of the intrinsic meaning of marriage Dr Doms appends a valuable chapter on "Virginity and Celibacy," of which he treats on lines similar to those already made familiar by Père Mersch, and two final chapters on "Some Applications to Moral Theology and Consequences for the Pastoral Ministry," which bring the pith of his argument to bear upon the practical situation which confronts us. There can be few books that so combine essential truth with practical counsel as this.

PATRICK MCLAUGHLIN.

SHORTER NOTICES

THE TESTAMENT OF FRIENDSHIP: THE STORY OF WINIFRED HOLTBY. By Vera Brittain. Macmillan. 10s. 6d.

The late Winifred Holtby was a novelist of genuine talent, a journalist of energy and sincerity, and a friend (it is clear) of great devotion and courtesy. Those who knew her were, no doubt, fortunate; and it was proper that Miss Brittain should have desired to raise to her this act of natural piety. It is therefore impossible, without appearing callous, to review it, in the ordinary sense, as a book. Miss Brittain has a sense of guilt at having (with others) "made use of her magnanimity to further our personal ends." Her prayers rather than her publications might have received her guilt. For the rest, Miss Holtby is shown to have been "a typical product of her age." That again is proper enough, but then the rest of the language is disproportionate. There is no evidence here to justify the great quotation with which the book ends: "The splendours of the firmament of time . . ."

There is a great deal in it about "the integrity of the artist." There is hardly a phrase which exhibits it.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

THE SOCIALIST SIXTH OF THE WORLD. By Hewlett Johnson. Left Book Club. Gollancz.

This is frankly a work of propaganda, in the sense that it aims at creating a favourable impression of Soviet Russia with a view to influencing British policy thereby. From the point of view of the author, therefore, it could hardly have been published at

a more unfavourable time. The invasion of Finland has produced a general sentiment more unfavourable to Russia than at any time since the Communist Revolution. The Dean of Canterbury's pleading falls upon the ears of a public disposed to be not merely deaf, but frankly derisive of his statement of the case for Russian altruism. Russian foreign policy once more assumes the appearance, as probably it contains the reality, of naked Tsarism. At the moment that fact is sufficient to make any detailed criticism of his book entirely academic. But it is still true that the social conscience which drives Dr Hewlett Johnson's pen, and which may well be the most vital force in the modern world, has produced many remarkable developments in Russia. The achievement of a real economic liberty for the masses is a main concern of the twentieth century. Present events only serve to show the utter insufficiency, even of that entirely Christian objective, in itself.

H. S. DEIGHTON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: A. C. Garrett, *The Man from Heaven* (8s. 6d.).

CENTENARY PRESS: J. Maritain, *Science and Wisdom* (10s. 6d.).

CHATTO AND WINDUS: B. Willey, *The Eighteenth-Century Background* (15s.).

DACRE PRESS: D. M. Mackinnon, *God the Living and the True*: Signposts No. 2 (1s.).

DEIGHTON, BELL AND CO.: J. Y. Batley, *On a Reformer's Latin Bible* (4s.).

EPWORTH PRESS: W. B. Whitaker, *The Eighteenth-Century English Sunday* (13s. 6d.).

FABER AND FABER: Sir Edwyn Hoskyns, *The Fourth Gospel*, 2 vols. (30s.).

GOLLANCZ: John Strachey, *A Programme for Progress* (Left Book Club, 2s. 6d.); Cedric Belfrage, *Let My People Go* (Left Book Club, 2s. 6d.).

LONGMANS: G. St Aubyn, *Towards a Pattern* (3s. 6d.); Alec R. Vidler, *God's Judgment on Europe* (4s.).

MOWBRAYS: F. P. Harton, *The Mystery of the Cross* (1s. 6d.); C. P. Hankey, *A Confession of My Faith* (5s.).

PAX HOUSE: P. Maryon-Wilson, *Caritas Christi* (1s. 6d.).

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS (Milford): A. H. Dakin, *Man the Measure* (17s. 6d.).

S.C.M. PRESS: W. Temple, *Christianity in Thought and Practice* (1s.); F. A. Cockin, *Praying in War-Time*; G. F. Allen, *The Call of God in Time of War* (9d. each); R. Niebuhr, *Why the Christian Church is not Pacifist* (9d.).

SHEED AND WARD: E. Gilson, *The Mystical Theology of St Bernard* (10s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: R. V. Sellers, *Two Ancient Christologies* (16s.); J. H. Hutchins, *Jonas Hanway* (8s. 6d.); *A Prymer of the Holy Eucharist* (2s. 6d.).

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